

EXHIBIT NO. 105

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF CODE CABLEGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT
14:33, OCTOBER 21, 1941.

London. Filed 19:20, October 21, 1941.

JAPAN

1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, *except* possibly into Thailand, because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States and Britain, especially in view of the firm stand taken by the U. S. However, Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans.

2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army and navy in order to make certain of their assistance in any future projects launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably geared for war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the Japs will advance on Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces the minute Soviet disintegration appears imminent. In the mean time, speeches by the new cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real intent. The Russians are still believed stronger in Siberia in spite of possible transfers of troops to the other theaters, but the Maritimes and Vladivostok unquestionably could be captured by the Japs.

3. The above comments were received from the Chief of the British Far East Intelligence.

RUSSIAN THEATER

1. The head of the British Mission is now stranded in Kuibishev and is not well in touch with the situation.

2. Budyenny is apparently relieved of command in the Ukraine if news that Marshal Kulik has been made commander at Rostov is true.

3. The Germans have extended their front approximately 12 miles north of Taganrog. An advance from Kalinin toward the north has been begun by the Germans, possibly directed at Vologda and the railroad running south from Archangel, according to dependable secret reports. Otherwise, there are no important developments in this theater which have been verified by British official sources.

4. The above cable is for General Miles' personal attention.

LEE.

I. B. #5, 10/22/41.

Distribution:

Under Secretary of War	State Department (2)
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	Director of Naval Intelligence (2)
Assistant Secretary of War	Record Section
Chief of the Air Corps (3)	Section File
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Situation Section
A. C. of S., G-3	EE
A. C. of S., WPD	CE
G. H. Q.	FE

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 14:09
NOVEMBER 9, 1941

London, November 9, 1941 (filed 5:10p) (1045)

The most likely spot where Japanese may be expected to strike is in the Netherlands East Indies. This opinion, from the British Ambassador to Tokyo, holds that as Japan already controls what she needs of the resources of French Indo-China and Thailand she will not proceed against the latter country. To attack British Malaya would be a difficult operation and the rumored Burma Road drive would also be too much of an effort. The Netherlands East Indies could be assaulted secretly from the Mandated Island, and would provide the oil which Japan needs. The source reverses his previous view and now believes

Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and this contemplated operation would confront the United States and the British with an accomplished fact.

LEE.

IB #4 11/10/41

Distribution :

Secretary of War	China Mission
Under Secretary of War	Office of Lend-Lease Administrator
Assistant Secretary of War	G. H. Q.
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	State Department
Mr. Lauchlin Currie	Chief of the Air Corps
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Situation Section
Director of Naval Intelligence	British Empire Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Far Eastern Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD	

G-2 COMMENT ON NOVEMBER 9 CABLE FROM LONDON

(IB #4 11/10/41)

1. G-2 is of the opinion that while an attack on the Netherlands East Indies is a possibility, it is by no means probable in view of: (1) the action to be expected of the United States and Britain before even a surprise attack could be driven home; (2) the great danger to Japan of trying to by-pass the Philippines and Singapore; (3) the knowledge Japanese must have that the Dutch have prepared their oil installations for immediate demolition, so that it would be a year or more before they could get the oil anyway.

2. It is significant that the Ambassador has reversed his former view and no longer believes that Japan will do everything possible to prevent war with the United States. Such a development is not unexpected.

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 22:42,
NOVEMBER 21, 1941

London, November 21, 1941 (filed 0045 p. m.)

In order that the source may be protected do not reveal to the British that you have received the following information.

The estimate given below represents the consensus of all British intelligence services as to Japan, on the basis of all information available up to November 18:

Whether or not the government at Tokyo has decided once and for all to take the chance of war with America and Great Britain is still not certain, but Japan's economic situation is making it necessary to come to such a decision. By initiating the present talk, Japan had hopes of discovering some solution to the problem. Now that she has sent her special envoy, the conversations are coming to a head and the chances are that she will make a basic decision of the policy she will follow.

As things stand now, the only action she can take without danger of war with America and Great Britain is to settle the China incident and her alternatives here are (1) block the Burma Road; (2) come to a peaceful settlement with Chungking. From the best available information at present, it does not appear probable that Japan will launch an offensive against the Burma Road.

In the event the current talks come to nothing and if she then makes a decision to go ahead without regard to the consequences of war with the ABD powers, Japan has the alternatives of offensives against (1) *Thailand*. The tin and rubber producing areas are in the vicinity of the Kra Isthmus which would no doubt be defended by the British so that economically, Japan would not get much by occupying Thailand, and she stands to lose much of what she is already getting from that country.

(2) *Malaya*. Japan will certainly occupy Thailand before attacking Malaya, but any drive on the latter country would certainly involve Japan in war with Great Britain and very likely with America also.

(3) *Netherlands East Indies.* It is estimated that Japan has enough oil supplies to last for only nine to twelve months of large scale operations, so that seizure of the Netherlands East Indies would solve a most urgent problem for her. But such a move would not be sound naval strategy and furthermore Japan must know any such attack would bring on war with America and Great Britain. The British believe Japan would occupy Thailand before moving on Netherlands Borneo anyway.

(4) *Soviet Siberia.* Here the main consideration is that Japan is not yet strong enough to start an attack which would undoubtedly cost her plenty in casualties and matériel, and might take a long time. In spite of her offensive preparations, including increase of troops in this area from eleven to 29 divisions, Japan will probably not attack the Maritime Provinces unless and until Russian strength is considerably diminished there.

The estimate concludes that:

(1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on her part;

(2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased;

(3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the United States;

(4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road;

(5) From the Japanese viewpoint, her best move, the one with least chance of bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand is indicated by her recent movements.

LEE.

IB #18 4:15P 11/21/41

Distribution:

Assistant Secretary of War	State Department
Assistant Secretary of War for Air	Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Chief of the Army Air Forces	Office of Lend-Lease Administrator,
Chief of the Air Corps	O. E. M.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD	Situation Section
G. H. Q.	Air Section
4th Army	British Empire Section
China Mission	Far Eastern Section.

[Pencilled notation:] Return to C of S. HLS.

[Pencilled notation:] To Secretary of War. GCM.

BRITISH EMBASSY ANNEX,
Observatory Circle, Washington, D. C., 22nd November, 1941.

Subject:—Japanese Intentions.

SIR: The Joint Staff Mission has received from the British Chief of Staff the following telegraphic summary of an estimate by the Joint Intelligence Committee in London of Japan's probable intentions.

We are instructed to invite you to draw the attention of the United States Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to this appreciation.

Respectfully,

(Signed) R. D. COLERIDGE,
Commander, R. N.

R. F. G. JAYNE,

Major.

Joint Secretaries,

British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

Commander L. R. McDowell,

U. S. Secretary for Collaboration,

Room 2724, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATE BY J. I. C., LONDON, OF JAPANESE INTENTIONS

1. It is not certain that Japan has reached a decision to risk conflict with Britain and U. S. A., but events are driving her to early decision. Japan hopes that present conversations in Washington may provide a way out. The climax of the conversations now reached by KURUSU'S arrival and fundamental decision on policy is likely to follow their outcome. Meanwhile only course open to Japan which she may think would not involve a risk of war with us and United States is to try to finish war in China.

2. To end China war Japan must either make peace with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK or stop his supplies by cutting BURMA ROAD. Two routes of attack possible. Shortest is from TONGKING to KUNMING, but terrain makes this a very difficult operation. Longer route westward of KWANSI province feasible but operation would take longer time than Japan prepared to give. Latest intelligence indicates that southward movement of forces from TONGKING and CANTON suggest major operation against BURMA ROAD unlikely at present.

3. If Washington conversations fail and Japan decides to proceed irrespective of risk of war with Britain, U. S. A. and Netherlands East Indies, she may attack—

- (a) THAILAND,
- (b) MALAYA,
- (c) NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES,
- (d) MARITIME PROVINCES.

4. *THAILAND.* Japan's infiltration into THAILAND and building of communications in Indo China, construction of aerodromes, work on Naval base at CAMRANH BAY, indicates preparation for move into THAILAND. Japan would consider this move least likely to involve action by ourselves and U. S. A. Main strategic advantage only gained if KRA ISTHMUS occupied simultaneously with land move from INDO CHINA. Little economic advantage to Japan in occupation of THAILAND but object of attack would be to secure important bases for further move south.

5. *MALAYA.* Occupation of THAILAND leads logically to attack on MALAYA. This would be certain to involve ourselves probably U. S. A.

6. *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.* Capture of Dutch BORNEO would remedy Japan's most urgent shortage i. e. oil. Operation would however be strategically unsound from naval point of view and Japan would think it would involve conflict with us and U. S. A. We believe attack would be preceded by occupation of THAILAND.

7. *RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES.* Since beginning of Russian campaign Japanese forces facing Russia increased from 11 to 29 Divisions. Only interest Japan would have in attacking Russia would be the removal of traditional enemy. Operation would be long and expensive if Russian resistance were maintained. Japan now lacks sufficient superiority to make offensive operations against Russia probable unless Russian forces are weakened.

8. CONCLUSIONS.

(a) Japan will make last effort at agreement with U. S. A. Decision whether or not to take aggressive action involving major powers would follow failure of conversations.

(b) If such decision is taken THAILAND will be first probable objective involving least risk of major conflict. Occupation of bases in THAILAND including KRA ISTHMUS is a sound strategic preliminary culminating in operation against MALAYA or NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Recent military movements support opinion that THAILAND is next objective.

(c) Action against Russia likely to be deferred until position of Russia in Far East is seriously weakened.

(d) Operation in China will continue in absence of a general agreement with U. S. A.

(e) Early attack on BURMA ROAD is unlikely in view of latest information of diversion of forces southward from NORTHERN INDO CHINA and CANTON.

EXHIBIT NO. 106

Section A: Admiral H. R. Stark's Letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel (Pages 2144 to 2225).

Section B: Admiral H. E. Kimmel's Letters to Admiral H. R. Stark (Pages 2225 to 2257).

SECTION A

Confidential

13 JANUARY 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: There are things to be said in here which are strictly *entre nous* and therefore I suggest you destroy this letter after reading.

I have given you a few days to let sink in the news of your becoming CinC, U. S. Fleet. I would have given my eye teeth to have seen your expression and to have heard your exclamation when it happened, but instead I was just sitting behind the scenes congratulating you and the Navy. I confess it came sooner than I had anticipated but that it should come, I have long had in the back of my head and while rejoicing with you I realize fully the enormous responsibilities placed on your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and where the Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have to bear the brunt.

I would give a good deal to sit down and have a chat with you. I am hoping J. O. will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifications of which [2] call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans.

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and personally I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliberately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if some day some one opens the door of my office and reports that the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

My estimate of the situation—J. O. R. can give you this—McCrea also has a copy—which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H... of a job, and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your guts and your head, at the seagoing end. Also your *CAN DO*—rather than *can't*.

In King, I believe you have the very best possible man to handle the situation in the Atlantic and that we can give him a free rein. He will lick things into shape and he knows the game from every standpoint and of course in this war it will be [3] fought from every standpoint. On the other side—in Tommy Hart—I feel equally confident.

I believe in Walter Anderson you have a good man to handle the Battleships but I do not commit myself one inch beyond that. Any future advancement beyond that position will depend largely on your recommendation but he should fight a good fight right there, whether or not he goes up. It is unfortunate in some ways that we could not get the additional stars and rank we wanted in the Atlantic but we could not and consequently the accommodations had to be made in the Pacific. With this you are familiar. Of course Andy feels disappointed but he is a good soldier. However, when we mentioned the possibility of his relieving Snyder next June, I informed him that I would not commit myself and that I could not think of committing you, and incidentally, and very incidentally, and in all cases, the White House finally decides. This, of course, is White House prerogative and responsibility, and believe me, it is used these days.

I hope Wilson Brown does well. He is fine fiber, as you know. Frankly, I had some misgivings about his health and had him brought to the Navy Department for a thorough checkup by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. It is not

necessary that anybody, beside you, should know this. Medicine and Surgery gave him a perfectly clean bill of health but I do think he should be watched while under strain and if there is any sign of his not being able to stand it, he should be relieved. Again, I am giving just you my thoughts. The President knows that I initiated this physical checkup because of my doubts, but beyond just a few of us, it is not known.

[4] What Peck Snyder's final reactions will be, I don't know. We wanted to run this whole schedule differently but our hand was forced. I have always regarded him with a good deal of admiration because of a feeling that above all things he was loyal and would play the game in the last analysis as it had to be played and as you and I have to do. Here's hoping.

I am sending you Savvy Cooke and I feel like I am losing one of my arms. That boy has one of the best brains I have ever run into. I put on his efficiency report that I would make him an Admiral immediately, if I had the authority and believe me, if he were one, I would not consent to his going. I am sending him to sea to protect his promotion chances and am sending him to the Fleet Flagship because of his intimate knowledge and personal handiwork in all that we have done in War Plans and in all that we have been thinking. I feel that he should have a year in command, although were I going to sea myself I would be strongly inclined to take him on my staff. Where we put him he should be available to you in both capacities. His capacity for work is almost unlimited and in addition to all his other fine attributes, I have formed a very strong affection for him, as we all have. He is just as likeable as he can be. Should his ship go to the Navy Yard and you would like to keep him with you during any such periods, it could be arranged.

I am also enclosing a letter to you which I wrote to Tommy Hart and which I am pleased to say he stated gave him a clearer picture of his own situation than even he himself had formed on the spot. That is my excuse for sending it.

Murphy, who is on Richardson's staff, has been with us on three different occasions and is likewise pretty familiar with [5] our thoughts back here.

I have directed McCrea to stop and see you on his return from the Philippines although he can probably add little to what Murphy can tell you. On the other hand I would be glad to have you have a long talk with McCrea that we may get from you any first-hand material you want to send.

Nimitz has written J. O. with regard to several matters which explain themselves so there is no need for repetition on my part.

J. O. has been thoroughly acquainted with the personnel situation. He knows that it has been one of my first thoughts ever since I have been there, as well as Nimitz, and that I have put more time and struggle on it in the White House and on the Hill than on any other one subject.

I am home at the moment laid up with "flu" and have been busy with Mrs. Hull a good share of the afternoon, it now being ten minutes of six and Charlie Wellborn just came in with the mail so I will close. Were I to write you volumes and I feel like it, I doubt if I could add much that you will not realize without my writing.

Just remember that I consider the only reason for my being alive and kicking at the present time is to do everything within my power to serve the Fleet, and I want you to write me fully, frankly, critically, and just think out loud on all subjects wherein the Department can be of help. Nimitz and I are absolutely at one in our common desire to serve and I wish you *all* the luck in the wide world.

[6] Finally you will be glad to know that there is a great deal of fine and favorable comment on your selection from all sides. I have had letters from Admiral Senn and Admiral Craven among others, not to mention the reaction here in Washington.

Again good luck and keep cheerful and God Bless You.

BETTY.

You know how I believe in conferences—keeping your key people informed—taking them into your confidence, and thrashing out common problems—no bulkheads—and here again, I know you will accomplish much.

Again good luck.

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,

USS HONOLULU,

c/o Postmaster Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: The following is a telephone call to one of my Aides when I happened to be out:

"Admiral Train said that the Navy Relief has received no money from the Fleet during the Year 1940. He wondered if it might not be a good idea for you, as President, to ask CinC whether or not a sum may be expected, in view of the necessity of making up the Society's Annual Report."

Can you give me the answer?

Of course you probably have all the "ins" and "outs" by this time of Snyder's stand with reference to his being detached and on which he insisted.

It is over the dam and I won't say anything more about it.

However, you have Pye in his place. I hope the change is an acceptable one to you. Personally I think he may be of even more assistance to you and I told the President you might even want to keep him on after July.

I have always thought Pye one of the soundest strategists we have and when I worked under him during my last cruise, which I often did at one end or the other of the line, I thought his handling of tactical situations outstanding. Particularly were his orders a model of clearness, brevity and effectiveness.

Who gets the Battle Force next June will be largely dependent upon your recommendations. Of course Andy is much interested but I told him flatly that I would promise him nothing, that he was getting a great job where he was going and that the future was largely in the lap of the Gods and Admiral Kimmel.

It always sort of hits me with a thud when people are planning ahead and looking for something in advance rather than giving all they have to the job in hand. Andy happens to be one of those fellows who does give all he has to the job in hand, but my feeling has always been that the job should seek the man rather than the reverse. Thank the Lord that Nimitz agrees with me and if people understood that it has to be that way in the last analysis, it would save a lot of correspondence and delicate situations here.

One of the biggest kicks I got out of your present job was that it was a complete surprise to you and has the overwhelming approval of the Service.

I confess my own job here was something I had not dreamed of. Incidentally, I told Bloch when I expected to stay at sea and he was talking to me about getting three stars or more, that if I was of use anywhere it would be another year right in the billet where I had trained for a year, and as far as I was concerned the only thing that should count was the best interest of the Fleet, that was also would be my best interest, and that I would serve cheerfully anywhere under anybody. That is the kind of a gang I hope you have around you.

Started this just to send you Train's remarks and have gone into something else. Lord, I wish I could see you, or better still, that I could be with you. I would take most any old job down to the lowliest division in the outfit.

Every good luck in the wide world and "keep cheerful."

As every sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 29 January 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is really a P. S. to my note of this morning.

I just want to let you know I am pressing all I can to take over the Coast Guard and that at last pressure is beginning to tell and I am hopeful I may be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this to anyone but just keep it in the back of your head as one of those things which might be coming along.

The above is incidental to what I did want to tell you and which you might mention to Bloch and that is I have asked Waesche to exert unusual and continuing vigilance in searching all fishermen, both on home coasts and in the islands, under the guise of looking for narcotics — —; actually to insure against any secreted Japanese mines.

Am still fighting for personnel—I shouldn't have to—but I am—
 When I think what I have to go through for almost every additional man for the Navy—and the Army building up to 1½ millions—it just doesn't make sense—

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
 Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA,
 Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
 Washington, 30 January 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Take it for what it is worth.
 Copies also to Admiral Bloch, Blakeley, Hepburn, Freeman, King, Hart.

KD

Tokyo
 Dated January 28, 1941
 Rec'd. 7:10 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
 Washington,
 131, January 28, 8 p. m.

Press reports radio address yesterday afternoon over station JOAK to Japanese in North America by Admiral Nobucasa Suetsugu. Concluding sentence quoted as follows: "Japan dislikes war but if United States persists in its misunderstanding Japan is fully prepared. I ask all of you as Japanese subjects to serve the country in your various positions."

GREW.

TFV

Secret
 In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
 Washington, 10 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long since have learned my habits.

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will continue in future communications of our similar searching analyses. Just for a moment refresh on your paragraph 3; and permit me to say "check and double check."

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way.

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter of the 25th (0129) are just signed.

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time

until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possible could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder; we have distributed them to the outlying stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should be put aboard ship.

Every good wish in the world.

As ever sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the 27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with one or two other things.

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but still objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared to make a quick decision if it is ordered.

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Nimitz and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple of weeks ago, even before I got your letter, the President told me I was overcrowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary with increased complements so we *may* have to ask for the doctors' opinion regarding the new complements.

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satisfactory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a misnomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back on the West Coast.

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral Bloch.

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new

sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them.

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vesels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday".

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.

All good wishes.

Keep cheerful,

/S/ BETTY.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 25 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of special importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog," we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to "Dog" (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could wish for more.

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids. I hope that you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint—but, again, you may consider that they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly *SECRET*) you and I may be ordered to make the, so it is just as well for you to have considered plans for it.

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

Secret

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department

recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff conversations (and thank the Good Lord there has been little no public leak that they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions reached just as soon as we can.

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the office for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I always have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the governing sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, were sound.

Keep cheerful.

All good wishes and Good Luck

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.

*Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,*

[s] BETTY

[1] Sent to W. H. by Capt. Callaghan

Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

11 FEBRUARY 1941.

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its un wisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southward or into Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.

[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his

submarines which are in urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:—

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

[4] The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could, of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plan our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view.

Op-12-CTB
Secret

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.

1. The despatches from the Naval Attache in London concerning prospects of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI to Tokyo indicates to me two things.

(1) The demands by Japan will be far-reaching and

(2) The February 10th date is too soon for an attack, as the negotiations are likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan:

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent of the governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.

(b) The size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan is insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. So far as I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move.

Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations she will assuredly occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and air bases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land forces in Indo-China in readiness for action against Malaya and British North Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Hainan. I question her readiness to attack the British before June, but this belief is subject to revision.

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can continue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration.

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's success in the Balkans. If the Germans succeed in conquering the British Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-China.

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reenforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.

H. R. STARK.

Original set by Clipper Lock Box—Confirmation by Capt Lammers 2/28/41
Secret

27 FEBRUARY 1941.

DEAR ADMIRAL HART: Admiral Stark is leaving Washington today for a short trip to the Caribbean, expecting to be back on the job about 13 March. I have just brought to his attention certain information which he has asked me to give to you.

As you know, we are having Conversations here in Washington which we hope will be completed in from two to four weeks. Upon completion of these Conversations Rear Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., one of the participants, will proceed, I expect by air, to Singapore and possibly Australia and New Zealand to inform officials there and also British CinC, China, of the results of the Conversations.

Admiral Danckwerts has expressed a willingness to stop in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Kimmel and in Manila to talk to you in regard to the same. Admiral Stark thinks this is an excellent plan. He wants me to inform you of this fact and to say that I think Danckwerts is very clever but honest. Ingersoll says he thinks it best for you to listen and talk little.

The Department will inform you of Admiral Lanckwerts' movements and prospective date of arrival in order that suitable arrangements can be made for meeting him.

I expect to return to London as soon as Conversations are finished. Will you therefore acknowledge by radio to Admiral Stark receipt of this letter?

With kindest regards, I am, Sincerely,

R. L. GHORMLEY.

Admiral T. C. HART, USN
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet
USS HOUSTON
 (Duplicate to Adm. Kimmel)

Nav-HH.

Personal and Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
 Washington, D. C., 3 March 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letters—references—

(a) Confidential, official—#P16-3/(0217), of 7 February 1941, subject—Recommended Complements.

(b) Secret, personal, of 18 February, 1941, to Stark, on various matters, and

(c) Confidential, personal, of 16 February 1941, to Nimitz, re Ordnance P. G. and various matters.

have been read carefully considered in the light of the situation which confronts the Bureau of Navigation. No enclosures were received with Bunav copy of Reference (a), nor have such enclosures been received in C. N. O. office so far as I know.

The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are necessary if our fleets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ordnance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance.

Furlong can give you some idea of these developments when he reports. He should have had the help long ago of many of the Ordnance postgraduates in the Fleet, and he endeavored to obtain their services but was denied by my Bureau on the well-founded theory that even though many of the Ordnance P. G.'s in the Fleet were not working at their specialty, they were usefully employed, and the Fleet should be saved as much as possible from changes.

With the appointment of a new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance the Secretary directed me to give Blandy all practicable aid in the form of competent officers to assist in producing ordnance supplies. The Secretary is fully aware of Blandy's requirements in personnel and the necessity for taking a considerable number of ordnance post graduates from the Fleet. I will add also that Stark is fully informed on this subject.

In a recent dispatch to you I informed you that Crawford would soon be ordered to the Bureau of Ordnance. He is specially needed to speed up torpedo production, and it is unfortunate that Pye must lose this office from his staff. The designation of the remaining forty or so officers is being left to you with

the idea that you will so arrange detachments and re-allocations to minimize the damage to fleet efficiency. I will be glad to approve such reassignments within the fleet as you consider necessary. The Atlantic Fleet also gives up a number of Ordnance P. G's.

I note your warning against the detachment of considerable numbers of qualified officers from the fleet and the enormous risk therefrom. I yield to no one in my anxiety to have the fleet ready at the proper time and you can rest assured that I am always ready to bear full responsibility for my acts. I am fully cognizant of the great responsibility which you bear and it is my firm intention to support you to the maximum extent possible.

As you well know, this country is confronted with a most difficult problem—that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course, that which will keep her actively fighting while we are building up our strength. No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly increase and complicate our problems of the future.

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G's. In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qualified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new aviation officers lack a great deal of being ready to serve the fleet when they first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional training and experience needed.

If you will grope backward through your memory as a budget officer you will realize that the serious shortage of aviators which now confronts us can be charged largely to our failure to operate Pensacola at maximum capacity during those years when we used only a fraction of that station's capacity to fill the pilot seats in the Fleet. I remember also our efforts to obtain funds to give active duty to a few hundred naval R. O. T. C. ensigns. While it is idle to speculate on what might have been, the present situation is not without its ironical aspects.

Now for a discussion of the enlisted personnel problem. You are no doubt aware that Stark and I have fought stubbornly and constantly to increase the authorized number of men in the Navy and to bring ships' complements not only to 100% but to 115% in order to train in advance of the readiness of new or acquired ships the key men for them.

[3] Just about the time we thought we were well underway to that objective, the President received information from several sources that our ships were being seriously overcrowded. It was obvious that his informants were in or had been in the Fleet. Recently, the Captain of the TUSCALOOSA reported that his ship was overcrowded and asked for detachment of about 50 extra marines which had been placed on board. His Division Commander, Pickens, by endorsement confirmed this opinion and further stated that the same comment applied to all heavy cruisers.

As the President had cruised in the TUSCALOOSA fairly recently, both he and his private physician, Rear Admiral McIntire, were definitely of the opinion that there were too many men on the TUSCALOOSA for health and comfort. I have taken steps to ascertain how many men were on board during the President's cruise and at the time Pickens recommended the removal of the extra marines.

Recently some bluejacket wrote Senator Downey, of California, a complaint of intolerable conditions in the PORTLAND due to overcrowding. When the matter was referred to me I asked CINCUS to investigate and give me data upon which to base a reply. CINCUS's reply, which you should get from your files and read, confirmed the overcrowding in the PORTLAND and further stated that the number of men in the PORTLAND at the time of the complaint was less than was being proposed by the Fleet Personnel Board.

You will agree that if the President also receives such comments (and no doubt many bluejackets or their families write him) Stark and I will have a hard time selling him the idea that ships' complements should be increased as you recommend in reference (a).

Our recruiting may be prejudiced by similar letters from afloat as indicated by the following quotation from a letter written by an Inspector of one of our Major Recruiting Divisions:

"From underground sources it appears that the ships are so crowded that men hesitate to ship over. I have had personal letters and contacts from good men to that effect. A relative of mine—a farmer boy from Maryland whom

I advised to join the Navy six years ago—is a patternmaker first class on the ALTAIR. He writes me for advice about shipping over as living conditions on the ship are almost unbearable. I mention this because it seems to me a matter of concern even though it's none of my personal business."

However, to offset the above unfavorable picture of overcrowding, Commander R. W. Cary, U. S. N., recently executive officer of the CHICAGO, gave me a memorandum of changes made in that ship to increase her living accommodations without apparent overcrowding. I enclose a copy of his memorandum, marked "A", and I will urge on the C. N. O. and Chief of Bureau of Ships to [4] provide the funds and equipment you ask in paragraph 11 of reference (a), not because I believe the President will approve increased complements to fight your ships, but primarily because I believe that every combatant ship should be ready to carry on board as many excess men as possible for training for new construction.

The President now feels so strongly that we will make our ships unhappy by overcrowding that Stark and I will need every bit of assistance and assurance that you can give in order to obtain his consent to carrying more than the present 100% complement on board.

I recently sent you a draft of a proposed letter which should help a little in reducing unexpected detachments. I enclose another copy, marked "B" and request your suggestions.

The failure of many of our men to reenlist when discharged from ships in Hawaiian waters is understandable but very disturbing. While many men may leave that area with the intention of reenlisting after leave in the States, I am afraid we lose a large number of trained mechanics to industry when they come home. The remedy for this is both your problem and mine, and I welcome your suggestions for increasing reenlistments afloat.

I appreciate receiving your letter re broadening the employment of negroes aboard ship. Your suggestions are sound and will be followed here as long as we can withstand the pressure. Two negroes have been appointed to the Naval Academy for the class entering next summer.

Legislation has been initiated asking for 232,000 men in the Navy during normal times, with a limit of 300,000 for emergency. Prospects for passage are favorable. Stark and I wanted to ask for about 500,000 but were turned down by the President who insists on a year by year program. Present Operating Force plan for 1942 will require about 290,000 men.

Legislation has been initiated for going to three-year Naval Academy course, commencing with the class of 1943, which will be scheduled to graduate in June 1942. The Class of 1942 will graduate in February 1942. Prospects for passage favorable.

Before closing this already too long letter, let me assure you that when we get the report of your Personnel Board with its recommendations for increased complements, we will give it serious and sympathetic study, particularly if your Medical Board of Survey of Living Conditions on board indicates that more men can be accommodated without prejudice to health and comfort.

Referring to the large numbers of young Reserve Ensigns being ordered to duty afloat, I know that you will do all in your power to continue their naval education and training. These young men will be useful and valuable in direct proportion to the effort made by our regular officers to train them. [5] We must lean very heavily on them to help meet the requirements of new construction.

In order that the Fleet may comprehend the personnel problem confronting the Navy as a whole, I shall publish to the service in the near future a circular of information as to how we plan to meet the personnel needs of our two-ocean Navy. In spite of anything we may attempt to do ashore we realize that it is on board ship that the most important training must take place.

If you or any of your officers have a formula for manning new construction with nuclei of ship-trained men without getting them from the Fleet,—by all means, let me have it!

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,

/s/ C. W. NIMITZ.

Encl.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., 28 February 1941.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Transfers to Shore Duty.

Reference: (a) BuNav Manual.

1. The Bureau will furnish to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, and Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, the waiting lists for shore duty maintained in accordance with reference (a), Articles D-7024(6), (7), and (8).

2. The shore duty waiting list will be revised and issued quarterly. It will contain only the top men on the list whose transfer ashore may normally be expected during the succeeding twelve months. Fleet Reservists will appear separately on this list as the Bureau will continue to give preference to Fleet Reservists for transfer to shore duty.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, are requested to place men in training as reliefs for men on the shore duty lists so that the latter can be transferred on short notice.

In reply refer to

Initials and No. Op-30C-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation

Subject: Accommodations for Increased Complements of Heavy Cruisers.

1. In accordance with your request, I am supplying the following information gained from my experience as Executive Officer of the CHICAGO in regard to accommodating the increased complements of heavy cruisers.

2. When I left the fleet on December 29, 1940, a complement required for heavy cruisers of the CHICAGO class had not been worked out to the last man, but it appeared to be very close to 1100 men necessary to man the additional batteries installed, and maintain the rate of fire required by modern war conditions. I note, since my arrival here, that the Fleet Personnel Board recommends 1099 men for this class of cruiser.

3. To meet the berthing, messing and other accommodations necessary to accommodate our estimated number of 100 men, the CHICAGO obtained additional bunks and lockers while at the Navy Yard—a sufficient number to bring the total up to 996. This installation was done principally with the ship's force. The arrangement for installing these bunks and lockers was done entirely by the ship's personnel under the supervision of the First Lieutenant who gave it his careful attention and succeeded in getting these in without violating the standard spacing between berths in any one tier of 21", and without finding it necessary to utilize any of the messing compartments. To accomplish this it required an almost complete rearrangement of berths and lockers in each compartment. When this installation had been completed, it was found possible by utilizing office space and other miscellaneous spaces large enough to take from one to three or four berths plus what space was left available in the berthing compartments, to install 113 additional bunks and lockers. This number had been requested from the Bureau of Ships, but I am advised that no action [2] as yet has been taken on that request. If it is approved, and the bunks and lockers are installed, there will be a total of 1,109 bunks and lockers on the CHICAGO.

4. Up to the time that I left the ship, we had had a peak load of some 1,050 men on board. The cafeteria system of feeding this large number of men has proved to be satisfactory. The over-all messing time for this number of men was less than it had been under the old messing system for a lesser number of men, but the actual serving time was slightly longer, amounting in all from 30 to 35 minutes. The mess hall space required was reduced to two messing compartments in place of three as previously used, by the fact that the rate of serving corresponded very closely to the rate of eating by the men, so that as the latter part of the line was served, the earlier part of the line had eaten and cleared the tables. The important feature of the satisfactory operation of

the cafeteria system on any ship, but particularly ships with complements considerably larger than originally designed for, is the organization for the service of the food.

5. Additional washroom and toilet facilities are also required for an increase in complement. This was accomplished in the firemen's washroom, while the ship was at the yard last summer, by a rearrangement of existing installations which permitted the installation of two additional showers, two additional bucket troughs (accommodating about 8 men each), two additional head troughs (approximately 5 seats each), one additional urinal. A similar effort was underway in the deck force wash room at the time I left the ship, but I do not know the extent of the additional facilities this would provide.

6. We found it essential in the tropics to take steps to increase the ventilation of some of the berthing compartments and the mess hall where the steam tables were located. This was accomplished by the ship's force, but it is probable that additional ventilating equipment will have to be installed in view of the recent decision to blank off all air ports on the second deck and below, as well as some on the main deck.

7. The effect of the increased number of men in the berthing compartments on the health of the crew was considered by the medical officer not to be a serious menace, up until the time I left the ship, provided that we were a little more meticulous in the observation of sanitary measures. This involved a careful watch for the appearance of bedbugs, cockroaches and other germ carrying pests and special care in the sterilization of mess gear after meals. It also included the prompt segregation of personnel showing signs of colds, flu and other nose, throat and chest diseases. Although there were two mild epidemics of flu in the fleet during the past Fall, the CHICAGO had comparatively few cases in spite of the fact that I believe it was more crowded at the time than any other ship in the fleet.

8. From my observation of other ships which have had additional berthing facilities installed together with information received from the First Lieutenant, before I left the ship, we were of the opinion that they had not been as successful in the arrangement of their berthing space as we had been on the CHICAGO. This appeared to be due to a failure to plan the arrangement with the same care that the CHICAGO had used.

/s/ R. W. CARY,
Commander, U. S. N.

*CHICAGO Complement 872
TUSCALOOSA Complement 876

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10/Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 22, 1941.

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letter of February 18th was handed to me upon my return from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Island;—literally, a flying trip.

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to the questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, here goes:—

The Checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must have had acknowledgments by this time.

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3—a copy of which I have—seems to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not comment any further on that subject; except that, with regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully understand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.

With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now, have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands. Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra Islands should not exceed the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water, and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new PTC's at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 28 immediately.

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed by the Congress and signed by the President.

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accomplished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.

With respect to paragraph 10: Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you of March 5th, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's letter that all requirements will be completed either in the May, 1941, voyage of the U. S. S. LASSEN, or the ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that island and asking you to assist in transporting them from the mainland to Oahu. Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the availability of magazines.

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation; 5,000 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly.

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substitute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the Fleet.

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels; Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may be ready for service.

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with additional destroyers for some months, if then; in fact we may have to take some away soon.

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraph 14 and 15 relative to complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted:

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all types of ships since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by improved A. A. defense, D. G. equipment, splinter protection and increased ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accordance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way are obtained.

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear, sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approximately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel

Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions as shown by table.

	<i>Over increase men</i>	<i>Resulting weight added</i>
BBs -----	286	143 tons
CAs -----	228	114 tons
CLs -----	136	78 tons
DDs -----	57	28.5 tons

(c) While the decision against recommended increases was based on weight and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions on berthing space introduced by sealing of airports on the lower decks has made the space component of more importance than formerly.

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed increased complements for the additional AA batteries installed.

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.

[4] (f) On a comparative basis the complements now allowed are 10-15% greater than those assigned by the British on similar types of ships.

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bureau of Ships requesting comment on the maximum number of men which can be accommodated on the various types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considerations. The reopening of the case depends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.

P. S. The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It is anticipated that it will be recommended for approval to maximum extent permissible within space, weight and stability recommendations of BuShips.

Paragraph 18 of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every possible effort to provide the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate only limited by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by *specific directives* to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out that the Navy Department in the face of long and determined opposition has been successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models of naval airplanes now on order for the *Fleet*. This priority (A-1-b) is higher than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the P40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.

VP -----	PBY5	197
VSB -----	SBD-2 & 3	262
VF -----	F4F	324
VSO -----	SO3c	260
VSB -----	SB2c	70
VTB -----	TBF	108

1, 221

Your paragraph 18 recommends acquisition of two more "sea-train" vessels. Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's, 2 New Jerseys, 2 Manhattans, was recommended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jerseys as you probably know was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 15, 1941, but *funds have not yet been made available*. The New Jersey type is now used for ferrying loaded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled airplanes of the scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. I might add that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and stack arrangement are being prosecuted. No provisions will be made for airplane landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying capacity for the Manhattans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded; under these conditions the planes could not, of course, be flown off.

In answer to your comment in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional stores ships and transports, the following obtains:

On 15 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for three additional store ships (AF). The President cut it to two. The status of legislation authorizing and appropriating *money* for these two vessels is indeterminate at the present moment. It is hoped these vessels will be acquired sometime during the current fiscal year.

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels will report for duty by June or July, 1941. In addition to their intended employment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be necessary for forces afloat to use one or more of those transports to meet transportation requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships, negotiations are being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed and ready for service.

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to OincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moved over each route.

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The date appearing on the chart is the date 1939, which was the last complete year for which export and import data on commodities was available at the time the chart was revised.

Every good wish as always.

Keep Cheerful.

Unload all you can on us.

Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong cross currents and tide rips—just as we do you—and.

Best of luck,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No.
 Secret

11932

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 Washington, 4 April 1941

DEAR KIMMEL: It has been sometime since I have dropped you a line, but like you, have been literally sawing wood seven days a week and there has been nothing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart covering this subject.

I made a two weeks inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in the United States South of Washington, and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so I had had no close liaison with him until his return this week. Spent over three hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some thoughts in it as a result of that Conference. I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence, and I mean by that, nobody but you and Hart and King, that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

I realize that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter of "timing". Something may be forced on us at any moment which would precipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler in forcing us into the war unless, of course, Matsuoka agrees to fight at the same time. On the surface, at least, the Japanese situation looks a trifle easier, but

just what the Oriental *really* plans, none of us can be sure. I have had several long talks with Admiral Nomura and unless I am completely fooled, he earnestly desires to avert a Japanese crisis with us. We have been extremely frank with each other.

I am enclosing a memo on convoy which I drew up primarily to give the President a picture of what is now being done, what we would propose to do if we convoyed, and of our ability to do it. It concerns you directly in the detachment from your command of what I believe to be necessary for King to have, to do the job. I feel it is only a matter of time before King is directed to convoy or patrol or whatever form the protective measures take.

You may not agree with me on this move. I can only hope that I am right. The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sinkings with regard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is much worse than the average person has any idea.

Our officers who have been studying the positions for bases in the British Isles have returned, and we have decided on immediate construction of 1 destroyer base and one seaplane base in Northern Ireland. We are also studying Scotland Iceland bases for further support of the protective force for shipping in the northward approaches to Britain.

I am also enclosing a memorandum, which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it, covering the President's talk with Ghormley and me yesterday.

I hope and I believe that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as I have it to date without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottlenecks and the million other things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well from the press.

I might add that I am thoroughly in accord with your recent letter to Nimitz, can assure you of Nimitz' support, and that the letter was helpful from every standpoint.

We handed the State Department and the Attorney General something to unravel when we took over the German, Italian and French ships last weekend. I had about as busy a 24 hours and about as interesting as I have had for sometime. I find that I stuck my neck out only in taking over the four Danish ships in the Philippines, but at least we have them and even if there was no law to support my action, I am glad I did it and the Big Boss, when I "fessed" up, approved. As a matter of fact, most of it was in hand before he knew about it. This letter is really long enough or I would tell you how we started the ball rolling and what a splendid job the Coast Guard did on short notice. Of course, the pity of it is that we could not have done it months ago before the sabotage took place. We have been pressing to do it for sometime and when I got word Saturday afternoon of the sabotage on a couple of ships, we jumped the gun.

Am sending copies of this letter to King and to Hart, although King is pretty familiar with affairs here because of his proximity and an occasional visit which is a great help.

I just realized I had not touched on what we refer to as "practice cruises" which detachments from your force have recently made to Australia and New Zealand. I think there will be more of this to come; my hope is they will be confined to positions on the Jap flanks and that they will have some of the benefit which the President and the State Department expect from them. Of interest to you is that we are directing King to make similar visits to Cape Verde, the Canaries and the Azores; of course with a very few units.

Coast Guard has just been directed to turn over to the British 10 of its 250 foot cutters.

Rainbow 5 should be on its way to you all shortly.

Keep cheerful. All good wishes.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

11932

APRIL 1941.

Secret

OCEAN ESCORT IN WESTERN ATLANTIC
(West of Longitude 30° West)

HALIFAX CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Usual British Escort; 1 XCL—occasionally augmented by 1 BB or 1 CC or 1 C.
Last Summer British occasionally augmented the 1 XCL by 1 large SS.

Westbound traffic has had no ocean escort.

Ships over 12 knots go it alone.

Ships under 12 knots put in 9 or 6 knot convoys.

BERMUDA CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1941

Without escort until they join Halifax convoys some hundreds of miles East of Halifax.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

About February 15th British Chiefs of Staff stated that hereafter all convoys from Halifax must be escorted. Minimum strength of ocean escorts either:

1 BB or

1 CC or

1 CA or

1 XCL plus 1 large SS

This statement was made before the recent cruise of GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST changed the picture.

U. S. NAVY PLAN

Our concept for the minimum strength of ocean escorts, so long as danger from GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST or similar vessels remains, is:

1 BB plus XCL plus 2 to 4 DDs.

If BB be not available substitute 2 CAs.

Obviously this escort might be weaker than German attackers, and therefore covering operations in the general area by heavy ships and carriers are necessary at times.

To keep present flow of traffic moving, 2 to 3 convoys a week, 7 escort units are necessary.

In the Staff Conversations the British stated they will make available to the United States for assisting in the above work:

10 XCL

2 DD (Old)

8 SS

The proposed war deployment of the Atlantic Fleet, as at present constituted, is:

(a) Northwest Escorts, based in Northern Ireland (Admiral Bristol):

9 DD

18 ODD

42 VPB (possibly 54)

(b) Ocean Escorts, Western Atlantic:

3 BB

2 CA

2 DL

7 DD

4 ODD

4 DMS

(c) Striking Force, based Bermuda:

2 CV

2 CA

4 DD

6 VPB

(d) Southern Patrol, based Trinidad:

4 CL (7500 ton)

Several 327 Coast Guard cutters

(e) Gibraltar Submarine Force:

12 OSS

(f) Bay of Biscay Force, based England:

9 OSS

- (g) North Atlantic Coastal Frontier:
 12 VPB plus Canadian corvettes of an unknown number.
- (h) Caribbean and Panama Coastal Frontiers:
 1 PG
 9 DD
 24 VPB
 8 OSS

At the present time 1 BB is under regular navy yard overhaul, and one is under emergency repairs; these are due for completion respectively 19 May and 28 April.

The RANGER must go under three months overhaul April 17th. From 5 to 10 DD and 1 or 2 cruisers must remain under overhaul most of the time.

Consideration of the above shows that the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide the minimum ocean escort considered necessary. Shortages will be especially bad until June first. With the GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST at large, I consider 2 carriers, at least 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers the minimum for an effective striking force.

To provide a proper degree of safety for convoys in the Western Atlantic, and to provide an important striking unit for catching raiders, the following reinforcements in the Atlantic are necessary:

- 3 BB (IDAHO, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI)
 1 CV (preferably LEXINGTON)
 6 DL
 12 DD
 4 CL (new), (although this Division might come later).

If this movement is made, it should be done with the utmost possible secrecy.

The possible effect of this transfer as regards Japan is realized, but must be accepted if we are to take an effective part in the Atlantic.

Secret

12212

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 19 April 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Recent correspondence regarding cruise to the Northwest; Detachments for the Atlantic; Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1; etc., etc.;—well I can sort of visualize and hear you saying "Why the Hell doesn't Betty make up his mind on what he wants to do?"

First, I will put at this point rather than at the end of this letter.

"Keep cheerful" and help me to keep my sense of humor which is a little taxed sometimes.

And again:—

Just remember "We are doing the best we can."

I wrote you about the Australian Detachment. The President said (and incidentally when I open up to you this way I don't expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep things secret better than you can); "Betty just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to keep them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing." This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State Department's suggestions and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course I recognize some merit, if exercised with some discretion—and that is where Navy has to count on F. D. R. for reserve; so we did not have to send ships into Singapore and we did keep them on a flank to be in position to go to work or to retire if something broke.

Interruption—The thought just flashes across my mind that Savvy Cooke is now with you. He has much background. I know you will talk to him freely, just as I always have.

To that extent, namely, more or less in position if something broke, I acquiesced in the Australian Cruise with far more grace than I would have otherwise. I am not insensible to the advantages of a cruise of this sort, as well as to the disadvantages of interruption in training.

Now when the question of "Popping up everywhere" came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?" He said; "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."

There was a little method in my madness as to the Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for most anything.

I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said; "Please, Mr. President, don't let him do it"; or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.

The above very briefly touches the high points of this episode and gives you its inception and its calling off.

I realize sometimes it might be less upsetting to you mentally not to tell you these things and then have them called off. On the other hand, I never can prophesy just what will come and in order that you may be prepared, I endeavor to keep you informed as we go along. You can just assume, or begin to guess, what goes on sometimes in between drinks.

Now let's take up the letter we sent you regarding the Detachment coming to the Atlantic and without checking up, I believe it was 3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CL and 2 squadrons of destroyers. This was the first echelon for the "Battle of the Atlantic." The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detachment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized and directed in its detail by the President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific direction to bring only the one CV and I division of destroyers, with which you are now familiar. The reason for the change was that the President did not want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion that this will hold until there is some further clarification, incident to Matsuoka's return to Tokyo and this further illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right now as to our intentions. I am telling you, not arguing with you.

You have received the word with regard to the 4 minesweepers.

We are starting the "T" Class submarines, now in the Atlantic, into the Pacific. You will have to look out for them some way or other until a Tender is ready, which we anticipate will be sometime in August,—the USS *PELIAS*.

The foregoing is just to give you a little inside information on recent events. I have really nothing new to add. The situation here is a little more hectic than usual, particularly because of the effect on the public of the situation in the Balkans, and the Near East. Your estimate of this situation probably will differ little from ours; that it is critical is obvious.

For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the time seems not yet ripe for their adoption.

Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 specifically implements the President's thoughts which he has been debating in his own mind for sometime. Whether or not it will actually be put into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining this situation further today as a result of conversations with Mr. Hull, who is counselling something less aggressive. I will add a P. S. when this is typed Monday.

I had hoped that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill we could look forward to some unity on Capitol Hill but just at present there seems to be far from that desired unity on vital issues. What will be done about convoy and many other things, and just how much a part of our Democratic way of life will be handled by Mr. Gallup, is a pure guess. From that you might think I am getting a little bit cynical, but believe it or not, that is not the case, and I am sawing wood as usual and am still cheerful.

The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremen-

dous issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be of more help to him.

Hoping you are cheerful and with all good wishes, Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA.

P. S. I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, King returned from Hyde Park and as a result Hemispheric Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today.

BETTY.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, April 26, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the Japanese situation.

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1 CV, 4 CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale.

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 or WPL-49.

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.

Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House.

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.

I am just in receipt of your letter. We will send you the Public Relations Officer. I shall also go over the personnel situation again with Nimitz. I think we all see eye to eye in what we want to do and I agree with you that key men just should not be removed short of extreme emergency.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 15 May 1941.

Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of May 5, 1941, which it was a pleasure to receive.

The present plans for the Secretary's trip are briefly as follows: The party will consist of the Secretary; Captain Frank E. Beatty, U. S. N., Aide to the Secretary; Mr. Rawleigh Warner of Chicago, Illinois, a personal friend of the Secretary's; and Mr. John O'Keefe, private secretary to the Secretary. It is expected that the party (if Secretary can get away) will leave here May 24, 1941, and, accompanied by Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, U. S. N., will depart from San Francisco at near dawn in XPB-2Y-1 on May 26, 1941, reaching Pearl Har-

bor, T. H. late the same day. The Secretary is looking forward with much anticipation to the trip. As you know, he is keenly and intelligently interested in the entire Naval Establishment, and the Fleet in particular. I am sure that both the Secretary and you will profit from the visit.

The above arrangements are, of course, only tentative. I am informed that the President will speak to the country on May 27, 1941. In view of this, I have a mild suspicion that some change in the Secretary's plans may be necessary.

All of us here are aware of your difficulties in connection with the loss of so many of your experienced men. Our proposal to automatically extend enlistments during war and national emergency was introduced in the Senate by Chairman Walsh on January 14, 1941, but has not been introduced in the House, as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. The matter is not as simple as it appears on the surface. The Selective Service Act provides that a man inducted in the Service for a year's training must be discharged at the end of that period, unless the Congress meanwhile "has declared that the national interest is imperiled." Nimitz feels, and I agree, that Congressional action to freeze our enlisted personnel can best be accomplished by basing our demands on the same grounds provided for in the Selective Service Act, i. e., when "the national interest is imperiled." Accordingly, we are introducing legislation which will provide that whenever the Congress shall declare that the national interest is imperiled, all enlistments in the regular Navy or Marine Corps which are in force at that time and which will terminate during such emergency shall continue in force during the emergency, and that men detained in the Service in accordance with the above shall, unless they extend their enlistment, be discharged not later than 6 months after the date of termination of the emergency. At the same time, the legislation, as proposed, [2] provides for a suspension of Section 1422 of the Act of March 3, 1875, which provides for pay and a quarter for men retained in the Service beyond the normal expiration of their enlistment.

Meanwhile, you have by this time the Department's dispatch about the provisions of revised statutes of Section 1422, Act of March 3, 1875. It is hoped that this will help relieve the situation to a certain extent.

On May 6, the Bureau of Navigation issued circular letter No. 55-41, having to do with the subject of transfer of enlisted personnel in forces afloat. In this letter, it was stated that, until further notice, the transfer of enlisted personnel from forces afloat will, in general, be by rating and not by name. This contravenes Navigation's policy, which has been in effect for some time—that of ordering men from sea to shore duty, using length of Sea Service as a basis for such transfers. The change will permit you to retain your experienced men and transfer those whose service can best be spared.

As to nucleus officer personnel, Navigation advises that it is often difficult, on account of urgency in issuing orders, to request nominations from forces afloat, but every endeavor is being made not to detach experienced officers where it can be avoided. We will be glad to receive your ideas on the subject of nucleus crews when they have been prepared, as you suggest, "in a more definite form."

Your plans for the landing at San Clemente have been received in the Navy Department. Fleet Training has studied them with interest. I have had a brief of the intended operations submitted to me, and I think the exercise will be of much value to all concerned. Needless to say, we are pressing preparations to the end that our landing forces will be well equipped; shortages remedied, etc.

Your remark about the use of AKs in connection with landing operations is concurred in. We have been able to get two craft suitable for this purpose from the Maritime Commission. Unfortunately, the conversion of these ships cannot be completed until the fall of 1941.

As suggested, I have informed the material bureaus of your ideas about availing themselves of shipping facilities between the coast and Pearl Harbor. I have done this by furnishing personally each of the Chiefs of Bureaus concerned with a copy of your letter. I am sure you can count on their active cooperation in this important matter. Yards & Docks, for one, shares your concern about the matter of transportation, particularly to the outlying bases. Two old Panama Railway Steamships—the Ex-ANCON and Ex-CRISTOBAL—have already recently been acquired and are to be operated for our account by the Matson Line. They will help but not solve the problem. How do you feel about families of our personnel (and Army) continuing to remain in Hawaii.

At the moment, there are no additional patrol craft that can be furnished the Fourteenth Naval District. As you no doubt know, effort is now being made to acquire a number of sampans, which should be of assistance in this regard.

DesDiv Elghty (80) is at Pearl Harbor, and 4 AMCs are going forward from San Diego under escort of the TIPPECANOE. We are also giving consideration to supplying some 165' coast guard bots for this duty. I must confess that our preliminary survey in this regard does not appear to be promising. I am keenly aware of your anxiety to save wear and tear on your destroyers, as well as releasing them from patrol duties for the more important duty of perfecting themselves in other phases of their training.

All of us in the Department are bending every effort to be prepared for war when and if it comes. I know you are likewise using your best effort to make the Fleet seady for all eventualities. Acquaint me with your troubles—I will do what I can—always wishing it were more.

All good wishes—keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 14 May 1941

MEMORANDUM

For Commandant, First Naval District
 Third Naval District
 Fourth Naval District
 Fifth Naval District
 Sixth Naval District
 Eighth Naval District
 Tenth Naval District
 Eleventh Naval District
 Twelfth Naval District
 Thirteenth Naval District
 Fourteenth Naval District
 Fifteenth Naval District

You will recall my previous letter of 3 October 1940, in which I stressed readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing mines on our front doorstep, etc. etc.

I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only

WHEN?

The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all tend increasingly this way.

If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, if one way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable, either from a material or psychological standpoint.

I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft-net program has lagged, am doing what I can about it; but it never seems enough.

This is just again to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn.

Plans and machinery for convoy are pretty well in hand but here, too, there may be hitches or slips which, in the last analysis, may only be found by actual practice. However, convoy games on paper by those who must handle the details should be good mental exercise, and may bring to light certain correctable deficiencies.

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?

I might add that some months ago (and less than that) our studies here in the Department indicated that if we did not get into this war by March we would be fairly well off in the local defense picture; later it was put at April with assurances that in any case I could feel fairly comfortable by the first of May. Now I am told the latter part of May or maybe some time in June or the first of July. It continues to be just "Around the corner." I think the time is here now for even more personal strenuous effort by all of us, in responsible positions.

Keep cheerful. Heap all the abuse you want to on my head, if it will help any to achieve our common objective.

I trust you are all constantly checking ways for speeding up readiness in every department.

[s] H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK.

Copy to Admiral King, Kimmel, Hart

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-Dy.

(Received 2 June)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 24, 1941.

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: I recently saw your letter with regard to ammunition. Regret the holiday in training caused by non-delivery and hope we can prevent recurrence.

We appreciate fully your personnel troubles. I have gone over them with Nimitz and trust your thoughts regarding non-disturbance of key personnel can be complied with.

I am sending you a secret despatch this afternoon with regard to occasional visits by small units of your Fleet to the west coast in the interests of morale. While you have not suggested this, my hope is that it will be conducive to contentment. Of course how closely an approved schedule for this could be followed in these times I do not know. I have just finished talking to the President about it and you can rest assured that so far as possible we will see it through. We would leave any press releases on this subject to you, as it is something for which your gang should look to you.

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, hospital ships, etc., to the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In this I include Bloch.

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such thoughts are water over the dam, and I am confronted with the problem *as is* and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare the necessary train.

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems—our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or what we would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate *for the moment* ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries

in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show".

In the last 48 hours we have been following the situation closely in Crete; and yesterday and last night the Naval situation to the eastward and southward of Greenland.

My personal feeling is that it is only a matter of time until the British hold on the eastern Mediterranean is very much confined or non-existent.

Only history will throw a full light on the Crete incident. Criticism will be rife but without full knowledge of the facts or at least more than we have at present I am withholding final judgment.

German raiders (as you probably will have learned before this) both surface and sub-surface are now working well inside the generally accepted limits of the Western Hemisphere, in fact to the westward of the 40th meridian. The British escorts therefore get thinner and thinner. The situation is not good. Last night's naval engagement and its train of events will come out in due time.

We are immediately confronted with taking over a considerable number of merchant ships for the Azores task—something I wanted to do as long as over a year ago. Also the Army is asking me to man 26 of their ships. I have been in touch with Admiral Waesche for the last 24 hours and that fellow has come across 100% and is agreeing to furnish 1800 men and 100 officers, which is literally a God-send from our standpoint. These men will include surfmen. The lot should man about 5 transports depending of course on the size of the transports selected.

We have an expedition of flying boats going to Iceland for temporary basing and for reconnaissance of the east coast of Greenland.

In addition we are sending three arctic ships to the Scoresby Sound area to look for German meteorological or radio stations and to remain there during the Summer, besides two other vessels and an Army contingent which are proceeding with the construction of an air field and plane base on the southeast coast of Greenland.

The Army also has an expedition studying Labrador with a view to the possibility of flying planes to that point then to Britain via Greenland.

The ammunition situation on which we are depending on the Army for supply, is bad. Even getting enough for the Azores is a problem. It promises not to get better before Fall.

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without *effective* aid from us. We are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics:—not a happy situation—and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.

The above are rambling thoughts for a few minutes conversation with you, Tommy Hart and Admiral Bloch. I will not try to put them in more logical sequence or dress them up further, simply assuming that you can straighten out the picture yourself as we more or less see it here.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

P. S. When I last wrote to you I indicated by doubts as to the Secretary leaving at this time. Personally I couldn't see how he could. He came to that same conclusion himself and you have been informed.

Tell Bloch that I knew it would raise "H" with towing barges to Palmyra and other islands when we ordered the two tugs to the Canal Zone but that they are essential for the Azores operations.

Referring to your letter of 15 May to Admiral Nimitz of which I have a copy:—I am quite in agreement with your thoughts. The despatch about holding men over-time was not with the idea of telling you to do it but with the idea that if you found it necessary you would have department backing. I think your own estimate is quite correct.

As regards freezing men for the duration—this is something which for years I have thought the Country should have on the statute books and during the

present emergency I have brought the point up many times but without success. I am not through trying but I doubt if we can get in a period short of war.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
*Commander-in-Chief,
 United States Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 20 June 1941.

Op-10D- Hu

DEAR ADMIRAL: At my conference this morning with Admiral Stark he said that he knew just as soon as you left he would think of something which he meant to tell you while you were here.

I think what he wanted was simply to plant the thought in your mind of smoke screen around Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack such as has been used by the British around some of their Scotland shipyards or closed harbors.

From what I understand it is something similar to the California smudge pots and leaves a black blanket and a very uncomfortable one, according to Captain Kirk, over the area immediately concerned.

The Germans did this at Brest, thereby preventing any accurate bombing or even vision of the targets.

The Admiral asked me to get this off as he had to go to conference and wanted to catch you before you left San Diego; also to give you his best wishes in which all of us here join.

Respectfully,

/s/ J. L. McCREA.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
*Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 % Commandant, 11th Naval District,
 San Diego, California.*

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/clp

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, June 26, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Colonel Maas is going to report for duty with you shortly.

He was just in to say goodbye.

He was one of our staunchest supporters and strongest friends, particularly in opposition to a single air force, for the United States.

He will fly from San Francisco to Hawaii in one of our 4-engine bombers. We were all glad to have him do it and give him a good picture of that-type of craft which he has so strongly supported.

He is not asking for any favors because of his Congressional importance. Nevertheless, I wanted to let you know he is coming and feel that his services with the Staff to Comairbatfor may be very helpful from many standpoints.

We had a very interesting talk yesterday afternoon from Jimmy Roosevelt. All agreed it was well done. As you may know, he just completed a thirty-five thousand mile flying trip with Major Thomas of the Marine Corps.

This afternoon Wellings is talking.

Am asking Lee to take down the interesting points of both talks to send to you. Some of them, I feel, will be useful and you should know.

You were made an information addressee on our despatch to Tommy Hart with reference to the next move which Japan might make. We feel strongly here that her attitude, at the moment at [2] least, will continue to be one of "watch and wait".

Our information on the German-Russian operations are so uncertain at the moment that it would be useless to give them to you. We feel it will take at least a few more days to give any sort of picture.

Every good wish, as always,
 Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
*Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

(Received 9th July)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 3 July 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have just written a letter to Tommy Hart and think the following from it might be of interest to you:

"I am still hoping you will be able to put over your thoughts about denying passage of the Japanese through the Eastern part of the Malaya Barrier; but I know from experience in the last War, as well as in this one, that what you say about 'trade and raider consciousness' is very pertinent.

"After a careful study of the ADB report we find that we are unable to approve it. Army and Navy War Plans are drawing up a letter to the British rejecting it, and requesting a new conference be held that will give a practical and realistic operating plan to carry out the purpose of ABD-1. The report has all the faults you mentioned, both in your official and your personal letters, and I do not believe it necessary for us to accept any such ineffective plan. Of course, I will forward you a copy of our joint letter to the British, which should be ready within a few days."

Have just finished a Budget session and am hoping to give you some of the things you want.

I really have no interesting news other than has been communicated to you by radio.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. It looks to us at the moment as you will judge by a despatch you will receive ere this as though the Germans had persuaded the Japs to attack Russia within the next month. It is anybody's guess and only time will tell.

/s/ HRS.

Secret
Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 7 July 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Referring to the last sentence, paragraph 4-E:

I think if I were the skipper of our cruiser and a foreign man-o-war told the Dutchman to stop I would tell the Dutchman to disregard the order of the foreign man-o-war. Moreover I would lay my ship fairly close to the Dutchman and between the Dutchman and the foreign man-o-war, and let the latter do his worst.

This is not an order; it is just a thought which I wanted to transmit to you.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Your imagination may produce something better. I hope it can. My imagination just now is almost beyond the elastic limit. It was working overtime last night in the White House conference, and will again before the night is over.

Keep cheerful.

Op-10D-MD

JULY 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HART, ADMIRAL KIMMEL, ADMIRAL KING, COMMANDANTS
OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS

In an excellent paper which I recently read, I was struck by the paragraph quoted below and am sending it to you for further circulation or such use as you care to make of it.

"It is to be noted that the unity and effectiveness of effort that has characterized German operations has been due not only to the organization of the Higher Command and to careful planning and training. *In a large measure, it appears to be due to the fact that the personnel of all ranks, including the highest, is imbued with a spirit of soldierly submergence of self in the accomplishment of the common undertaking.* It is suggested that it might tend toward the removal of some sources of friction in our Services if a secret letter on the subject were issued to officers of the higher ranks, down to and including the grade of Colonel in the Army and Captain in the Navy."

The lines italicized particularly struck me.

I am not aware of sources of friction in our Services at the present time. While differences of opinion are bound to crop up, not only between the different Services, but between forces of our own Service, they are, so far as I know, being ironed out. Certainly there is the will here in Washington to pull together which is bearing fruit, and which should ever grow stronger in purpose and effectiveness.

There are many leaves which we can take out of the German book—as well as many not to take.

H. R. STARK

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 July, 1941.

Secret

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Haven't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else.

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 553,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had with his mines firing after having been down several hours.

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having delightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as it is only July.

Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". Be sure to unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said I should make sure you did not overlook it.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

/s/ BETTY.

Secret

Op-10 Hu

24 JULY 1941.

DEAR TOMMIE: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

[2] Your people who have been laying mines must have had an interesting time, but just what the Devil the cause is is a conundrum still. BuOrd went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch sent you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very apprehensive until we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electrolytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not previously had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray Spear on the job. He got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Matson Lines as agents for the Navy Department.), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels en route, by rail, due to arrive in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite on August 10.

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Ordnance is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet

been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course, it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

[3] I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given away in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't drop you a line.

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. HART, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS HOUSTON,
c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10-MD
 Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, July 25, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I forgot to mention to you yesterday that you may be called upon to send a carrier load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports. I don't know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I want you to have the thought.

We spent a great deal of time on the letter which you will shortly get, relative to the training of pilots. Before sending it, I had King's complete Okay. As a matter of fact, he didn't change a word of it. I hope it will be equally satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Secret
 Op-10 Hu

Rec'd. 8 Aug. 1130

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 2 August 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc. etc.

We nor the British have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore, you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while. Am enclosing copy Bloch might find something interesting. Good luck

Keep cheerful.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *U. S. Navy,*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Tell Ad. Bloch—I have just directed sending him 12 P. T's—40 knot-craft.
HRS.

Copy Adm. Kimmel
Secret
Op-10 Hu

31 JULY 1941.

DEAR SAVVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the Country' decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a point protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say [2] opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one—and hence our consideration.

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 28 PBVs and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc., etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain [3] rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and what not, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows what not. Marshall's troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc., etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.

I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBY repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that". Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some [4] generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda wherever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you [5] think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity, etc. etc.

With all good wishes and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain CHARLES M. COOKE, Jr., USN.,

USS Pennsylvania,

% Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.

One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. When I got to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to whom I am also sending a copy.

H. R. S.

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, August 21, 1941.

Personal & Confidential

DEAR KIMMEL: I have your despatch giving your reaction to the personnel requested from you for the commissioning of two new squadrons of patrol planes and the squadrons for the HORNET, plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. This picture is set down on the enclosed sheet.

We know how tight the personnel situation is; also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. We have tried to look at the whole situation as it exists at present and as it will continue to confront us, war or no war, with the expansion now taking place in planes for the Fleet (or if you will, call them replacements, because losses are bound to occur once we get in).

The training problem we have already gone over with you.

The greater part of the burden of supplying personnel for the squadrons now forming has been placed on the Atlantic Fleet. We have the Atlantic Fleet practically at the elastic limit with the demands just made on it which are greater than the demands made on you, and in a situation where they are now operating, in many respects, on a war time schedule—keeping the routes to and from Iceland under surveillance as one example.

As we see it here, after complying with Bunav's despatches, you would be left with 112% of your allowance of aviation machinist mates, 119% of aviation metalsmiths, 118% of aviation ordnance men and 105% of all radiomen. This is an overall picture of numbers in each rating group from the Base Force report of 30 June. We realize that the distribution of ratings in each rating group leaves considerable to be desired.

[2] The shore establishments, including four main flight training centers, have only 61% allowance of aviation ratings, including radiomen. Further reduction there is just not practicable. Rather must the complements of the flight training centers be increased to approximately 100% in numbers, by January, in order to maintain the training schedule of those stations, and to permit the stations to function at maximum capacity, which they must do to meet their pilot production schedule necessary for your needs.

To man new squadrons we recently called on the existing units in the Atlantic for 298 aviation ratings. In addition the Atlantic Fleet is supplying 105 aviation ratings for advanced bases.

Manning these new squadrons is of paramount importance and we feel must take precedence over duplicate flight crews for existing squadrons. Duplicate crews will come in due time, provided we do not neglect training now, but will never come if we continue to curtail the training program. Intensive training in aviation ratings and radiomen (qual-air) must be undertaken afloat to assist in supplying trained personnel for the expansion program. The same is true of all ratings.

Now here's another shock: Patrons 91, 92, and 93 will be formed the last of this calendar year and additional rated men will have to be supplied for them. Tuck it in the back of your head.

Taking up Comairscovor's despatch of 18 August:

1. We are complying with his recommendation (a) that insofar as possible we recruit from Patwings Atlantic.

2. We will not reduce your qual-air radiomen below one per patrol plane. In making this concession it is necessary to ask that you increase the rate at which radiomen are qualified for duty in patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet.

3. Due to the installation of special blind landing instruments it is considered that radiomen with aircraft experience should be assigned to Dutch Harbor and to Kodiak.

[3] 4. Comairsofor's recommendation (d) applies with equal force to either coast. Inasmuch as Patron 84 will be stationed in the Atlantic, we thought it better to organize it in the Atlantic. Of course this picture might change. We can only handle it as far as we can see.

I wanted to give you the above and then ask you to transfer yourself to my seat and what I am up against here, and tell me whether or not you think our original order the best all-around solution to an obviously vexing and difficult problem.

The Atlantic Fleet is worse off in aviation ratings than the Pacific due to the greater demands which we have made on it. The Atlantic continuously fighting fog, long hours, and night work. Many of the Atlantic units are operating from advanced bases along the northern route—Iceland, Newfoundland and New England, with some operations in Greenland.

Nimitz is sending you a despatch today holding up execution of Bunav's serials 1450, 1394, 1397 and 1406 of August 11th until September 15th.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch. I would be glad to get your reply at the earliest practicable moment. We shall endeavor not to renew demands on you prior to 15 September.

It is a time when a "feller needs a friend", no matter where he is sitting, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific or in Washington.

I am just back from the meeting in the Atlantic. Am wading into a mass of mail which accumulated during my two weeks of absence. Will drop you a line giving you the best picture I can in a day or two. Meanwhile, many thanks for your letters which I found waiting, which were extremely interesting, and which I shall circulate to all concerned. Particularly did I enjoy the interesting news in your letter of 12 August.

[4] I have just dictated the above in the presence of and with the help of Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Brainard and Ramsey (Towers being away). Ingersoll, I am glad to say, is getting a much-needed vacation. All join me in sending you good luck and best wishes to all hands.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Unit.....	Hornet		VB-8		VF-8		VS-8		VT-8		VP-83		VP-41		N. A. S. Kodiak		Dutch Harbor		Project Roper		Total	
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
ACMM.....	1	1	1	2	6	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	1							14	19
AMM1c.....	3	3	2	2	9	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	4					1	23	28
AMM2c.....	3	3	2	3	10	2	3	3	3	2	5	6	6	5	4						23	27
AMM3c.....	4	4	3	4	21	3	4	3	4	7	6	6	4	7	5					1	22	34
Total.....	11	11	8	11	46	8	11	9	11	19	19	19	19	19	18	6	2	0	0	2	92	130
ACM.....										1	0	0	1								1	1
AM1c.....	1																				2	0
AM2c.....	1	1			1			1	1	0	1	1	1	0	2						5	4
AM3c.....	2	3			1				1	1	1	1	1	1	2						6	7
Total.....	4	4			2			1	2	2	2	2	2	2	5						14	12
ACOM.....					1						1	1	1	1	1			1			2	2
AOM1c.....			1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						5	7
AOM2c.....	1		2	1	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						17	8
AOM3c.....		1	2	2	5	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1						19	14
Total.....	1	1	5	4	13	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4			1			38	24
CRM.....	1	1		1	1		1	1			1	2	2	1	1						4	7
RM1c.....	4	4	1	1	1	1					4	3	3	4	1			1			14	14
RM2c.....	5	4	3	3		3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	7	2					2	21	28
RM3c.....	6	6	4	3	2	3	4	3	4	9	9	9	9	9	3						27	31
Total.....	16	15	8	8	4	7	8	7	7	21	21	21	21	21	5			3		3	46	57
Total.....	32	31	21	23	0	65	20	23	21	24	46	46	46	46	30	0	1	0	0	5	222	263
NAP's.....												16	16	16						2	222	26
Grand total.....	32	31	21	23	0	65	20	23	21	24	46	62	62	62	30	0	1	0	0	5	222	289

Legend: P—Pacific Fleet
A—Atlantic Fleet.

(Rec'd. 3 Sept.)
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, August 22, 1941.

In reply refer to Initials and Nos. HRS/mjf

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in the next clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite—may-be.

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District mate, (Admiral Block) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck—wish you were close by

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.

USS Pennsylvania, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

SECRET

August 19, 1941

DRAFT*Use Red and black pencil
notes from T.H.S.*

Dear Mustapha:

Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was insufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and
2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers ~~to~~ upon my return to the Navy Department.

I can readily understand your wish to kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers and 200 P-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown to Russia via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the fighters and naval escorts for same. On 11 August 1941, the Russian Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant General of their Army and a Captain of their Navy, was received by Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated that his country had pressing need for all manner of military supplies, planes - and anti-aircraft guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and that there

were no reserve stocks in the country from which to draw. The Secretary summarized his remarks by saying that, since the President had made the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counted upon to cooperate to the utmost.

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored." This will be done.

The conversations which took place ^{at sea.} between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystalize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was ^{announced} reached as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as

a result of the latter's attack on the provinces in question. ^{I have done my utmost to get a decision. It can't be had now either here or in London - I make no forecast.}

Of course, Japanese action against the Maritime provinces remains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. However, it is my own thought that if Japan gets embroiled with Russia over the Maritime provinces, such action could hardly react other than to somewhat relieve the pressure now being exerted by Japan to the southward.

If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific. ^{I could get no plan from the British - They did not have one - A.P. and Rainbow still prevail.}

We are in complete agreement about developing Guam and bolstering the defenses of the Philippines. The Army is sending everything it can out there. As you know, we are sending Tommy some PTs. More aid would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that it is pretty late to start on Guam anything more than we already have in hand. We will make all the progress we can, remembering that "Dollars Cannot Buy Yesterday."

SECRET

In discussing the priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific War, for your convenience, I shall quote the paragraphs from your ^{in order} letter and ^{follow each with} comment.

Paragraph 2(a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destroyer Transports. During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a Pacific campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they could be returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

Comment. We all recognize that the APD's were developed with a Pacific campaign in mind. We withdrew them to the Atlantic with great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Likewise, work is being pushed on the HARRIS and ZEILIN. I must confess that progress on these ships has not been wholly satisfactory.

↓ I more than confess - I admit it - the whole thing has been a headache - It was these old blocks or nothing - Slow as they have been - I am glad I took 'em over - At least we will have 2 we could not get now - Every AP has been a struggle - I am keeping the APD's open - don't give up hope - YET -

SECRET

ROUGH DRAFT FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER

August 16, 1941

Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter - Marine Equipment. The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly M1 guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come, they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

Comment. In reference to the 3" M1 guns, and the .30 caliber machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Headquarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its initial allowances in those weapons since 7 July 1941; that is, 12 - 3" M1 guns, and 30 - .30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .50 caliber M1 machine guns should be remedied by September, 1941.

An outline of the present situation in reference to Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which was forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet about 25 July 1941. It is believed that this presents as complete a picture as is possible at this time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the Army. Existing stocks in the United States are at present much too low to meet the requirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Marine Corps may expect their proportion to be delivered from the manufacturers more steadily and consistently in the future than heretofore.

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are likely to exist for some time, however, mainly due to the fact that quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient ammunition to fill immediate requirements of the Second Division.

SECRET

as it exists today may be specially obtained from the Army.

*we have marked
the Army pretty
dry now.*

The present outlook indicates that sufficient personnel will be available by 1 October 1941, to form for expeditionary duty a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave within the Division a nucleus for training of its remaining units. It is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by January, 1942.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter - Ammunition Facilities. The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barracaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

Comment. The Bureau of Ordnance has had all ammunition storage items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch, Funds have been obtained to extend the ammunition pier from 600 feet to 1500 feet. Since no authorization will be required to extend the pier from 1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to avoid delay. The funds required are \$250,000, which will eventually be obtained from Congress to repay the project robbed.

(b) No funds are available for the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch. No authorization has been obtained for the construction of these magazines. The Bureau of Ordnance will have these magazines included in the next authorization bill to be presented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at \$210,000.

SECRET

The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional land."

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

Comment. Building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. The Bureau of Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 1942) to take care of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necessary to repair and maintain the 1946 fleet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in the amount of \$20,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of an additional major battleship dock. This dock, together with the other facilities which will be accomplished with the money, will bring the yard up to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as follows:

- 12 months for 50% of the facilities.
- 18 months for the remainder of the facilities.
- 22 to 24 months for the dry dock.

~~Note: - The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Fleet Maintenance - Operations control making ships available for overhauls and set the priority for work at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.~~

The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this Yard of spare propellers and shafting - it has under procurement, additional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.

SECRET

The Shore Establishments Division intends to augment the working force as the capacity and work load are increased.

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the Bureau of Yards and Docks has issued instructions to expedite all of this work to the greatest practicable extent.

The recommendation to confine the activities of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to emergency and low priority overhauls can be accomplished by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers to West Coast yards but this recommendation is not concurred in for the following reasons:

(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 14, 1941, recommended that the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of handling "full overhauls and damage" with simultaneous drydocking facilities for 2 Battleships, 1 CB, 1 CB, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine railway. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments Division) dated June 26, 1941 in regard to building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 1943. The third paragraph of this letter is quoted herewith:

"It is believed it is necessary that capital ships be overhauled at Pearl Harbor if that Yard is expected to perform the war task that has been assigned.

It is, therefore, recommended that in the next revision of the availability schedule, a start be made toward an equitable diversion of the overhaul of Battleships and Carriers from Puget Sound to Pearl harbor."

It is
~~The Director, Fleet Maintenance Division,~~ believed that only by actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can the Pearl Harbor organization be trained and made capable of repairing 4.

SUBJECT

these ships in an emergency, together with development of necessary facilities.

(2) Repairs to British Naval vessels, particularly the larger types of ships, is absorbing a large percentage of the repair facilities of continental U.S. yards and it is expected that the demands will increase. East Coast yards are being used primarily for this work but it has been found necessary - due to full schedules of these yards - to send some British ships to Puget Sound and Mare Island.

If these latter yards are fully scheduled with our own ships (as can be expected if all Battleship, Carrier, Cruiser, and Destroyer overhauls are transferred to them from Pearl Harbor) it is problematical whether British ships can be repaired and overhauled at the rate that this is now being undertaken.

The foregoing comment by Fleet Maintenance is substantially in accord with your letter L9-5 (50) over L9-3 Serial 91176 of 1 August 1941.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter. Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now. - *I know it - and God knows - I wish we could send 'em -*

Comment. The present rate of recruiting is about 9,300 men a month. According to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits are required in order to meet the requirements of the service on June 30, 1942 based on present allowances. (This estimate is subject to variables such as changes in dates of commissioning ships and stations.) Therefore the Navy will lack a proximately 32,000 men necessary for Navy requirements on June 30, 1942. It is estimated that this will be enough men to

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fill complements and allowances on that date to an average of about 92%. The Fleets are now filled to about 94% of complements. This percentage will drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron allowances. It is estimated that Navigation can replace losses in the Fleets with recruits to maintain them at about the same percentage of men aboard to complements as at present. *Should be 100+*

The recent large withdrawals from the Fleets have been due to the necessity of supplying the crews for the large number of auxiliary vessels recently acquired and for the assembly of men for Advanced Destroyer, Submarine, and Aviation Bases. These demands were superimposed upon the demands for the regular building and usual purchasing program.

The above estimates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting of 9,300. Recruiting is now on the increase and additional men over the 9,300 monthly will be furnished to the Fleets. *We are spending \$1,000,000+ in advertising - hope to speed it up.*

Paragraph 2(f) of your letter. Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

Comment. It is contemplated assigning the SOLACE (AHS), EX-IROQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be in the latter part of August, 1941. Further, it is contemplated transporting Mobile Base Hospital No. 2 from New York to Oahu in the U.S.S. PROCYON (AK19) departing New York early in October; she is a 15-knot ship and will call at San Diego to debark some personnel and stores there en route.

So far as the new hospital is concerned, the contract for this has been let and presumably the work is underway.

Paragraph 2(g) of your letter. Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

Comment. The project is now underway to send twelve PT's to the 14th Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and transportation provided. This shipment will follow the six MTB's going to the 16th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.

Wish I had more - they will be coming - I know Xmas is too - but we are doing the best we can - and I am hitting all the time.

SECRET

Paragraph 2(h) of your letter. The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Wake Island.

Comment. The project of assembling advance Base Material has been raised to an A-1-a priority, and the assembling of this material is going ahead satisfactorily.

our highest priority

SECRET

Paragraph 2(i) of your letter. Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

Comment. In this connection, I quote verbatim the remarks of the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you may have the entire picture:

"The status of placing depth charges and under-water sound equipment on light craft is as follows (taken up by classes):

DEs and DEs - These vessels have depth charges and echo-ranging equipment authorized; some have the equipment installed and those ships that have not yet received their echo-ranging equipment will get Model QC Series commencing in September 1941. *Too slow I know - but I have been doing my best.*

AVDs - Stability conditions on these ships are not good and the addition of depth charges, racks, or Y-guns, and echo-ranging equipment will necessitate compensating weight removal. It is understood that the desired equipment can be installed providing the towing reel on the fan tail is permanently removed. A lightweight echo-ranging and listening gear equipment, Model WEA, has been developed which weighs about 1300 pounds, with deliveries commencing in October 1941.

The following are the requirements for the WEA equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D.C.
- (b) Head room required for hoist train equipment about 70 inches.
- (c) At least 24 inches between frames of ships to accommodate pedestal.
- (d) Remote control of train by means of cables and sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.

The above equipment is suitable for any installation in DEs (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts. Additionally, this equipment can be installed in any other types of ships having adequate space and power supply.

A lightweight listening equipment (Model JK-9), about 1300 pounds, has been developed and contract awarded for 230 sets; delivery

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commences in August 1941 at a rate of 10 each week. The following are the requirements for installation of the JK-9 equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D.C. or 24 volts D.C. (Two types of motor generators available, producing 115 volts, A. C.) Overall dimensions of motor generator set $29\frac{1}{2}$ x $13\frac{1}{2}$ x $11\text{-}3/4$ inches.
- (b) Maximum head room required for hoist train mechanism about 96 inches.
- (c) Only limitation or frame spacing is that it pass the 4-inch projector shaft.
- (d) No remote control - hand hoist and train directly connected to projector shaft.

This equipment is for listening only (no echo-ranging feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship having adequate space and power supply. Space allotted to the equipment must provide for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions $7\text{'-}9''$ x $26\frac{1}{2}$ x $20''$), receiver (overall dimensions $19''$ x $12''$ x $15\text{-}1/8''$) and sufficient space for the operator.

APDs - The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and now carry 24 - 300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these ships is so unsatisfactory that they will require 50 tons of fixed ballast. The installation of the WEA echo-ranging equipment, described under AVDs, above can be accommodated in these ships.

AMs and AVPs - The question of installing depth charge and echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has been referred to the Bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practicability of accomplishment.

It should be pointed out that draft and stability conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions are about to be issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau of Ships indicates that compensatory weight reduction must be made on practically a pound-for-pound basis in order to install the desired equipment. The installation of echo-ranging, or listening equipment is dependent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs.

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It is to be noted that the lightest depth charge rack now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500 pounds. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs 420 pounds, the total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be about 4000 pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater sound equipment is about 1300 pounds as is explained above under AWDs.

PEs, PCs, PYs, and YPs. All these vessels have depth charges, the number depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns.

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been authorized and will be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided."

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications. The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

Comment. Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

"During the fiscal year 1941 the Bureau of Ships placed contracts for radio and sound material amounting to approximately \$110,000,000. The material contracted for included all of the material listed in the 1941 and 1942 Communication Improvement Plans issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular 1941 budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law on June 11, 1940, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation act in mid September 1940. Considering the time when the necessary funds became available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid as could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. However, it is recognized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay

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at all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is objectionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and components have in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care of within the next few months.

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular 1941 appropriation act, which became law on June 11, 1940. Initiation of procurement of radio material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately after the funds became available. Funds for items later added to the allowance became available in September, 1940.

The tabulation below indicates the present situation as regards radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station:

<u>Allowed equip- ment</u>	<u>Installed</u>	<u>To Be Shipped</u>	<u>Expected Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2 TBM	1	1	Jan.1942	
2 TBP	2			
1 TBU		1	Mar.1942	
6 TBW		2	Sept.1941	
		4	Jan.1942	
2 TCA		2	Sept.1941	1 TBO-1 in use
2 TCB		2	Nov.1941	
1 TCC		1	Aug.1941	1 TBR-1 installed
4 RBA/RBB/RBC		4	Indefinite	New type-other receivers available if urgently required
6 RAS	6			
1 DY		1	11 Aug.1941	from NY Wash
1 DP		1	11 Aug.1941	LDN from NYMI
1 Inst. LDG Equip.		1	Sept.1942#40	on priority list; deliveries start Sept.1941
1 RAU		1	Oct.1941	
1 YA		1	Jan.1942	

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs at Kaneohe if required. These TBR-1 equipments are not necessarily reserved or intended for advanced base service, but are available for any use at the discretion of the Commandant or the Commander in Chief."

SECRET

Paragraph 3(b) of your letter. It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

Comment. Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and the Director, Naval Communications Division *in order named.*

"The Model XAF RADAR equipment developed by Naval Research Laboratory was installed in USS NEW YORK 12-18 December, 1938, and was tested at the same time as the Model CXZ Radar equipment developed by RCA Mfg. Co., and installed in USS TEXAS. These tests continued through March 1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 8 April 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment was returned to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of the Department as a result of which it was decided to proceed with the procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract was awarded 16 October 1939 to RCA Mfg. Co. The time between the date of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment was shipped by factory May 21, 1940. It will be noted that the time for delivery of the first equipment by contractor was approximately 13 months from the date of completion of tests in USS NEW YORK and 7 months after date of contract. The last equipment was shipped by contractor on June 20, 1940. The dates of installation of this equipment were dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned. A matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment was completed August 24, 1940, and the last on October 14, 1940, and the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the report on NEW YORK tests.

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" The Model XAF RADAR, built by Naval Research Laboratory, was tested afloat during the late winter and early spring of 1939. This test indicated that additional equipment should be purchased for trial. A study was made to determine the practicality of installing the equipment afloat; this study disclosed that only ten (10) ships could accommodate the large antenna array without first making extensive alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to the radio beam from the ships' structures. Chief of Naval Operations requested procurement of ten (10) production models of the XAF. The earliest that funds could be obtained to manufacture the Model CXM (copy of NRL Model XAF) was during fiscal 1940. Due to the higher unit cost of the equipment and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in connection with "neutrality enforcement", the Bureau of Ships could manufacture but six (6) complete units. When additional funds were made available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (14) Model CXM-1's were ordered as "stop-gap" equipment pending completion of development of an improved detector - the Model SC." *Long wanted - what he wants is Radars and more Radars.*

Paragraph 3(c) of your letter. For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

Comment. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships states:

" The need for a satisfactory recognition device in the fleet has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest one since the time of the last war and every idea advanced by the fleet, the Naval Research Laboratory or other laboratories that appeared to offer promise has been thoroughly investigated. This research has fully covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound spectrums. Many systems which were developed to a point which warranted service tests have been tested in the fleet and all have been reported unsatisfactory by the fleet even after modification by NRL and other

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- d. ASV - MKII (Fleet Air arm modified), British search equipment for use in large single engine planes.
- e. ABA - American recognition equipment.
- f. IFF - British recognition equipment.
- g. AYA - American high range altimeter.
- h. AYB - American low range altimeter.
- i. AI - MK IV - British Interception equipment - multi-place airplanes.

Search equipment (long range British ASV or American ASA) will be installed in all PBV-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installations are being made.

It is expected to install ASB (small search equipment) with a low range altimeter in one plane of each section of VTB's. All TBF airplanes will have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve space in all new VSB and VSO airplanes for the American ASB, and where practicable install this equipment in current types.

Initial installation is now being made of the experimental model of the ASB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available as soon as the equipment is provided.

Steps have been taken to obtain models of the British MK II ASV equipment (modified for Fleet Air Arm) for reproduction purposes. It is expected to supplement manufacture of American ASB equipment with an American version of the modified MK II.

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part of the American search equipment in all VPB airplanes. It is planned to equip one airplane of each section of VTB's with high altitude altimeters and another airplane of each section of VTB's with a low range altimeter for use with the ASB equipment (as indicated in paragraphs above re search equipment.).

Recognition equipment will be installed in all service airplanes at the earliest opportunity. The first 100 American ABA equipments are now due for delivery.

Still important!

SECRET

Interception equipments. Provision for these equipments will be made in a certain number of T4U airplanes as soon as the development in the United States and abroad of models suitable for use in single engine, single place airplanes permits. Pending this development, a test installation is being made of a British LK IV equipment in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available for use as interceptors as soon as this equipment can be obtained from either British or American source.

Projects have been initiated to design search and interception antenna structures which are most readily demountable and which are streamlined as much as practicable. Development of American search and interception equipment will stress ready removal provisions in order to result in maximum of operational flexibility.

*ought to
ship some
before
after then
invaluable
delay*

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser airplanes are dependant on installation difficulties and initial performance. A more comprehensive plan may be expected to be published about January, 1942.

The Bureau of Aeronautics remarks:

"Deliveries have begun on 104 Model NEA LIT equipments for aircraft together with 32 model BE/BF equipments for shipboard use. These will be given service tests in the fleet together with 3 Model BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at NRL September 22, 1941. The contractor is assembling material for 1500 additional NEA equipments and further production will be authorized just as soon as tests justify the step. All of the above is of American design but because of design and operational features it will not operate with corresponding British ship, shore or aircraft types. To provide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore and aircraft equipments are being flown to the United States and will be modified for production in the United States and supplied to all forces likely to operate with British forces. These sample equipments are due within a few days according to advices from the Naval Attache, London. The 56 equipments mentioned in the paragraph to which this comment is directed are for Support Force aircraft and eight are now in the process of being installed."

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Paragraph 3(e) of your letter. Radar equipment for submarine is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job. *S. J. [unclear]*

Comment. An omni-directional aircraft detection equipment was tested in GRAYLING on 2 August 1941. Although the results of the test were somewhat discouraging, the equipment showed sufficient promise to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a directional antenna system will greatly improve the performance of the submarine equipment; this project will be prosecuted. *yes - but when -*

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm surface-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for delivery about January 1942. The equipment which is being designed for making night attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be capable of taking accurate ranges and bearings on capital ships at distances in the order of 10,000 yards.

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equipment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. The delay in procurement of radio and sound equipment is not entirely due to the "elaborate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy Department is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment. *Thank God -*

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submarines are equipped with Radar. It is, however, highly probable that they are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much facility at night.

Paragraph 4(a) of your letter. Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

SECRET

Comments. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks:

"On 28 July, I signed a letter that embodied measures for the improvement of aviation training of pilots and other members of flight crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary school and fleet squadrons. I hope the effect will be salutary and beneficial in the immediate future. VP-13 will be held at San Diego to launch an intensive transitional training program in combination with the Training Test and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of pilots for the organization of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every experienced aviation officer in the training establishment ashore will be released for duty in fleet squadrons as soon as he can be replaced. The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons.

Aside from transitional training in the larger patrol planes, pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol squadrons whose primary task is their preparation for duty in active combatant squadrons. Although every squadron on the West Coast may be assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings ONE and TWO in the Hawaiian area to absorb any excess in personnel that cannot be trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and qualified personnel.

There will be an advanced carrier training organization at San Diego in accordance with my letter of 28 July. Additional new VO/VS pilots will commence reporting to the Fleet during August. Any of these pilots who cannot be trained expeditiously on board ship should be retained in the advanced carrier training squadron at San Diego for more flying, particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet.

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The priority accorded to the Army and British heavy bomber programs has been the cause of our most urgent attention. The final action on priorities was decided at a conference between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representatives of the Army Air Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office of Production Management. The net result was an A-1-b award to approximately 2,000 (plus or minus 500) additional naval aircraft, and brings a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest priority classification given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare aircraft are now planned for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare aircraft have been requested for patrol squadrons.

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation remarks:

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter, Op-22-B5, (SC) P11-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to establish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the following units:

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic--for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego and for the Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia--Purpose of these groups is to give advanced carrier training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from training centers, prior to assignment to carrier units in the two fleets.

(b) Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic and Transition Training Squadron, Pacific--Purpose of these squadrons is to give advanced patrol plane training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from the training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two fleets. These squadrons also train experienced aviators in the operation of the model PB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the model PBM airplanes in the Atlantic Fleet.

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Experienced Naval aviators have already been ordered to report to these training groups and squadrons when they are formed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these units.

By the letter referred to above, Chief of Naval Operations has indicated that during the months of August to December, 1941, inclusive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will be ordered to both fleets. Also, for the same period, 334 carrier pilots and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above mentioned training units for assignment to each fleet.

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning pilots out at such a rate that at all times thereafter, we will always have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the operating aviation units to meet all the fleet requirements, including double complements of patrol squadrons.

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV Schools training aviation ratings and radiomen (qualair) will be approximately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942.

Sixty-five (65) percent of the graduates of these Class "A" Schools have been marked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville and Miami, until about 8,170 graduates have been fed into the flight training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by about January 20, 1942.

This will leave an estimated balance of 18,926 Class "A" School graduates for the Forces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 30, 1942.

The allowances of patrol plane squadrons have been increased 220% over the 1941 allowances."

Paragraph 4(b) of your letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority -- A-1-a -- instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

SECRET

Comment. The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of WTB for the Fleet.

Paragraph 4(c) of your letter. Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

Comment. The conversion of the U.S.S. WAKEFIELD and U.S.S. HT. VERNON to auxiliary aircraft carriers with landing features incorporated is contemplated. Steps are now being taken to procure material and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable also the the U.S.S. WEST POINT will be included in the above category.

Paragraph 4(d) of your letter. A.S.V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

There is an aircraft RADAR project set up in the Bureau of aeronautics with the objective of providing all necessary equipment that can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due consideration for other essential equipment. The training of RADAR operators is underway so that by the time the equipment arrives there will be trained personnel who are essential for its successful operation. ASV sets will be provided as alternate installations in all carrier planes that can accommodate them and all patrol planes will be ASV-equipped. Every possible source of supply, including British and Canadian, is being investigated to accelerate the program. Three hundred Canadian ASV equipment sets are expected at the monthly rate of one hundred sets commencing 1 October, 1941.

and more if we can get the President to give them - To add the number is NO -

SECRET

Paragraph 4(e) of your letter. I.F.F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet, without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries, No delay whatever is acceptable.

Comment. This subject has been discussed elsewhere in this letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board is setting up essential requirements for RADAR equipment on board ship. The Board has been advised to incorporate the identification feature in ship control and fire-control sets since ~~there is good reason to believe~~ ~~that~~ identification is a very necessary part of the RADAR installation.

Paragraph 4(f) of your letter. Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBX-5's). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

Comment. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer have been advised of the nose section failures in the engines of VP-14. The loose-coupled shaft in these engines will eliminate the restrictions on operating the engine within the present critical speed range. However, this does not apply to VP-14 but this squadron is being supplied new heavier nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies if engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only three planes outside VP-14 have encountered failures in the light nose sections. The heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.

Paragraph 4(g) of your letter. Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

Comment. Funds in the amount of \$750,000 for this project are available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.

Paragraph 4(h) of your letter. Keehi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

SECRET

I will follow up.

Comment. The Navy Department has included Keehi Lagoon as one of the Navy-sponsored developments for commercial seaplanes in the Hawaiian area in its recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The War Department has an appropriation of approximately \$3,300,000 for this project and arrangements are being made for additional funds for the dredging which is expected to commence very soon. Navy patrol plane facilities are not included in the prospective plans for this location. Any special facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must be of a temporary nature.

Paragraph 4(i) of your letter. Development of the H.A.S. Barber's Point. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

Comment. Your comment on the need for this development is supported whole-heartedly in the Department and will receive the most careful attention until it meets the Fleet's need. Funds for Barber's Point in the amount of \$18,605,000 will be available in August and work begun immediately if the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House and has been approved by the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I want you to be fully advised. Don't hesitate to tell us how you think we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, and helpful criticism is always in order.

You no doubt have seen in the press about our conference at sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was most helpful. It is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being present.

With all good wishes, I am *long - oh Lord - too long -*
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty

(Rec'd. Clipper 3rd Sept.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 August 1941.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.

As of today we have about 262,000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of July. Our advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get at least 10,000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or what not.

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. Our *small* ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was perfectly delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example: I ordered an electric heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the efforts required.

[2] I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpenter, who came down to see me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have heard from Bunav direct.

I am delighted also over your comment about the reaction facilities and hope the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is satisfactory.

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation so will not repeat here.

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian

Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to AMs and ATs.

[3] Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, I am told those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think history has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where you are.

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department.

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great difficulties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were).

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are nearing solution.

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here.

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Op-10-MD
 Secret

SEPTEMBER 22, 1941.

DEAR TOMMY: Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you.

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued.

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, the Canadians

are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under King's direction.

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas through which convoys for the Near East, via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be released.

[2] The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain to occur. The rest requires little imagination.

The GREER incident created quite a stir. Senator Clark (Missouri) pushed a resolution through the Senate which called for the log of the ship. This, we will not furnish. Mr. Nye (North Dakota) submitted a resolution calling for an investigation by the Naval Affairs Committee into the whole incident. The enclosed is a statement I propose to make—and pretty well gives you the story.

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. Since the President's speech, it has taken on *added* significance. Since July, we have had 4500 marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest concentration of U-boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly correct, and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoy was in the immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable circumstances.

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is working hard on his home government and, while he appears to be making *some* progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation has apparently quieted down. One cannot help being impressed with the optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the Japanese appear to be making *some* effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. [3] She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which, at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.

The same sort of false hopes are being raised in our press with reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials is being much lessened. *When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Admiral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russians Military Mission that is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.

You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your arguments, pro and con, and we put some weight on those questioning withdrawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well may be—there is little that is static in this old world at present.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel. I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood letting". In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force". He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have "our foot in the door"—the door that once was "open", and if I had the say to, it would remain there until I was ready to withdraw [4] it—or until the door opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100% with you.

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention—or, if not, then in execution.

We are awaiting with interest your reply to our despatch about additional aircraft for you and our proposition about giving you some additional long-range submarines. It is, I take it, largely a question of your upkeep facilities.

Take care of yourself. Keep cheerful! And every good wish in the wide world.

Sincerely,

[s] BETTY

Admiral T. C. HART, USN
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.

Secret

Memorandum for Admiral Stark:

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of anti-aircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the anti-aircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1,500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila.

A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.

A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched.

A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

You may have had word of this already:
I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

(Rec'd 4 Oct.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 23 September 1941.

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

Secret

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern water, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVERIGN, RAMILIES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?

Keep Cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that *conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

P. S. #2: Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his

rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

[S] BETTY

Secret
Op-10 Hu

Received 23 Oct.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 17 October 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure you I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Will add a P. S. in the a : m., want this to make the clipper.

H. R. S.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability and my advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/s/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

CW/vt

Secret

OCTOBER 27, 1941.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: During Commander Kitts recent visit here, he and Admiral Stark discussed the enclosed secret memorandum for the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark wished the enclosed copy to be forwarded to you and has directed me to do so because of his own absence from the city in connection with the observance in Chicago of Navy Day.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES WELLBORN, JR.,
Commander U. S. N.
Aide to Admiral Stark.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
% Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.

[1] Secret

HRS/HU

8 OCTOBER 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This morning you asked me what I thought would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of United States naval craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic; also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.

The chief advantages to abolishing the combat zones, would, as I see it, be:

(a) It would permit American flag vessels to enter British ports. This would be of some importance now but of much greater importance as the United States Merchant Marine increases in size. The United Kingdom is handicapped for man-power. Any great increase in their Merchant Marine might mean reduction in their output of munitions. Therefore, there can be no question but that it would be advantageous from the war effort standpoint if the United States flag vessels, manned by American crews, could increase the shipping both to the British Isles and to other military areas. Moreover since our ships, particularly those which we are now building, are generally faster than British cargo ships, submarine losses might be expected to decrease.

(b) It is impracticable for the ocean escorts based in North America, whether United States or British, to make the entire trip across the Atlantic under normal circumstances. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large number of submarines have been operating in the Western Atlantic Area, no United States escort vessels could now be sent to the British Isles unless they were replaced in the Western Atlantic Area by British escort vessels. Were some of our ships to operate in British waters it would have the advantage of raising British

Morale, encouraging resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation, and would give the American people a stake in the decisive war area.

(c) A special feature of the situation discussed in subparagraph (b), would probably be the deterring effect on Italy with relation to a further war effort, and the encouraging effect on the French to resist German demands.

[2] (d) The effect on the German people might be to lower their morale and thus reduce their war effort. This, of course, might be offset to considerable extent, if, in the near future, they were to succeed in completely defeating the Russian Armies.

(e) It seems probable that Germany would declare war on the United States. The possible disadvantages of this are referred to in the succeeding paragraph. The advantages of declaration of war would be that the United States would be given a free hand in the operation of its armed forces; it would gain important belligerent rights over neutral shipping and commerce; and it would permit the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets to be employed for eradicating German raiders in the Pacific Ocean. It would give encouragement to resistance to the Germans by subjugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation. The United States could take appropriate action against enemy subjects, spies and agents within its borders. It would also permit specific offensive plans to be made by the United States Army and Navy. It would tremendously enhance the war effort put forth by this country and we could plan well into the future for the defeat of Germany with some assurance which we cannot now do.

The disadvantages would be:

(a) Until the present strength of the armed forces is materially increased by the programs now under way, the results which would be immediately apparent might be disappointing to the American and other peoples.

(b) A declaration of war by the United States against Germany unless Germany had previously declared war against the United States, might bring Japan into the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided disadvantage because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities on two fronts; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression.

(c) It is questionable if sentiment in South America will actively support the United States until this country is in a position to make a much stronger effort by land and sea than it is now able to do and until the results of its participation are apparent.

(d) A declaration of war would cause the loss of many of our contacts for information which we now have in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe. This, however, should not be a determining factor. I simply set it down, as one of the disadvantages.

[3] It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted.

It must be recognized that if Germany declares war on the United States and if the United States in consequence declares war on Germany, the United States must at the same time declare war on all nations who are Allies of Germany. This is particularly true in the case of Italy, as no distinction could be made at sea between German and Italian vessels. Such action probably would have a very marked effect on the morale of the Italian people. It might be possible not to declare war on such nations as Finland where the possibility of United States forces coming in contact with Finnish forces are remote. However, there are Finnish merchant vessels in operation in the Atlantic Ocean. I do not include Japan as an Ally of Germany—at least—Not Yet.

The foregoing has been hurriedly set down following your call. I thought it better to write it than to give it to you over the phone.

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have stated that the sooner we get in the better.

P. S. I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.

He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to.

He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to invade the countries he has.

When he is ready, he will strike, and not before.

Secret
Op-10-MD

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

Memorandum for—
Admiral King.
Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hart.

I am just about to get out something like the enclosed and thought you might be interested.

With regard to the *Salinas*, she was hit by two torpedoes, one fairly well aft and one about half way between the first hit and the bow. The submarine then came up on her quarter and fired three more torpedoes, two of which went astern and one ahead. At this time the *Salinas* fired at her—thinks she hit her—and the *Dupont* is believed to have finished off the submarine. This information came by despatch. Detailed reports are not yet in. We are, of course, sort-pedaling any matériel news and have mentioned nothing regarding any sinking or alleged sinking of submarines. We are constantly making submarine contacts, they having concentrated in our part of the northern passage for some time past.

One of the destroyers reported getting a great deal of oil to the surface after a bombing of a submarine, but her written reports likewise are not yet in.

Regarding the *REUBEN JAMES*, she went down so quickly that we know little. A despatch states that she was hit forward about abreast No. 1 stack. The explosion was so violent that it is possible a magazine was set off. The whole forward end of the ship was detached and sunk almost immediately—and the aft part about 5 minutes later.

When the stern sank, a number of depth charges let go, adding to the number of casualties. Rescue operations were greatly hampered by oil, darkness, presence of submarine, and cold. We published the casualty list this morning.

[2] We have a report that the safety pins on the depth charges had previously jarred loose. This, of course, is being looked into by the Bureau of Ordnance. The above is about all I know at present.

Lessons learned will, of course, be communicated after reports are in and study made.

My best to all hands.
Keep cheerful!

H. R. STARK.

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

A release announcing the torpedoing of the *SALINAS* has just been made, she having safely arrived at St. Johns.

The *SALINAS* was torpedoed on 29-30 October 1941, the day before the *REUBEN JAMES* was torpedoed. Initial reports showed her speed to be reduced to 5 knots and she had a long voyage to make the nearest port. Obviously, to have made public her damaged condition would have meant a direct invitation for further attack on her in the submarine infested waters through which she had to pass. Secrecy, therefore, was essential and every effort was made to maintain it.

Relative to the above, the following incident occurred:

One of the girls employed in the Navy Department reported to the Officer in Charge of the Office where she worked that she heard two officers telling about the torpedoing of a naval vessel, the *SALINAS*. She said she could not help but hear them and wondered if it were true.

It should be unnecessary to elaborate on this. Loose talk in public places, over the telephone, in the home, at a party, or anywhere else, except in strictly official circles, may bring disastrous results, the magnitude of which could only be weighed by what happened to be at stake.

It should not be necessary to add that this must stop. Any one worth his or her salt must realize the potential danger of carrying outside his or her office to anyone, *whose business it is not*, anything regarding naval plans or operations, movements or damage to ships, etc.

This memorandum has been intentionally withheld until the SALINAS arrived in port.

(Mimeographed and distributed to Department.)

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No I.p-10D-MD

22408
Received via clipper
14 Nov

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 7, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in a fine fettle.

Ok on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?!

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any permanent assignment of either, or both of these ships can be made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training—arriving etc.

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high-speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inasmuch as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production.

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delivered to the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.

I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only ten production models were manufactured; these were manufactured for the purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models could be developed and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU Class Cls, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the ranges of the anti-aircraft guns.

Relative to the two Seatrain vessels which we recently acquired and which are now undergoing conversion for use in transporting Aircraft, they now have readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships for this purpose. We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of planes to Europe-Russia-China? May have to charter them rather than take them over—in order conserve Navy personnel.

You asked about merchant ship conversions for carrier landing training operations. The field from which to get ships for this purpose is, as you know, extremely limited. However, the best of these have been earmarked for conversion to AVG's as soon as they can be made available. Right now the ones we have in mind are engaged in an *important duty*. Conversion will take 12 to 15 months.

[3] Your study of the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it looked like a very good paper. It will be of much help to us.

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I write to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclosing, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worsen and worsen"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

All good wishes.
Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

British movement of BB to far east area—I hope—will be completed in December.

Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

22915 received Clipped 20 Nov.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

removed conf. letter 182
on Fortification Guam

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much *definite* information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations had given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a *good* reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney".

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and

me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by *getting* or, rather, *not getting* into production. At last, we are "over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 22 sets. Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having fight deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty:—I agree with you 100%. The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is *far* from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She *can* be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which *could* be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an *important mission* (transporting British troops to the Middle East—*obviously most secret*) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot if we had those ships *now* converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat purposes.

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty (20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-McCormicks now engaged in the South American run. We have had our eye on the NORMANDIE. Thus far, State Department and President are adamant. I suppose they *think* that to take her over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. Of course, *if* Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice—what do you think of going ahead *now* with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which *might* be of service to us. To be sure, we *might* lose it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With all good wishes! Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[1] Secret
Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President :

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kuning is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kuning and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

[2] Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kuning over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of Naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

Secret

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu Sec #6

received 3rd Dec
#23593 Clipper

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, 25 November 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for

raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special [2] legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some to the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

[S] BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[3] P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From

many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

/S/ HRS.

Summary—Nov. 25, 1941

Type	Comple- ment fiscal year 1939	Comple- ment recom- mended by fleet BD	Present comple- ment	Number on BD	% on BD as of Oct. 31 where available other- wise September 30	
					To 1939 comple- ment	To present comple- ment
BBs.....	19,351	26,583	22,244	19,870	102.68	89.32
CVs.....	6,990	7,602	7,258	6,902	98.74	91.68
CAs.....	12,164	18,508	15,878	14,067	115.64	88.59
CLs.....	11,490	15,860	14,156	12,896	112.23	91.09
DDs (1850 Ton).....	3,119	3,900	3,119	2,826	90.60	90.60
(1500 Ton) (8 at 192).....	1,536	1,920	1,536	1,346	87.63	87.63
(18 at 191).....	3,438	4,392	3,438	3,138	91.27	91.27
(4 at 196).....	784	1,000	784	728	92.85	92.85
(8 at 178).....	1,424	1,952	1,424	1,312	92.13	92.13
(10 at 187).....	1,870	2,480	1,870	1,717	91.82	91.82
(12 at 200).....	2,400	3,000	2,364	2,171	90.46	91.83
(1200 Ton) (Asiatic).....	1,644	1,898	1,716	1,673	101.76	97.49
(4 at 132).....	528	584	536	446	84.46	83.20
(33 at 126).....	3,906	4,626	4,209	3,704	94.82	88.00
SSs (4 at 29).....	174	192	180	230	132.18	127.78
(22 at 39).....	858	946	858	891	103.84	103.84
(22).....	1,203	-----	1,203	1,390	115.54	115.54
(6 at 54).....	324	348	324	375	115.74	115.74
Patrol Vessels.....	1,062	-----	1,078	1,109	104.42	102.87
OGLALA.....	282	-----	320	290	102.83	90.62
ISABEL.....	84	-----	84	82	97.61	97.61
Totals.....	76,631	-----	84,849	77,163	103.39	90.94

SECTION B

[1]

COMMANDER CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE

UNITED STATES FLEET

Confidential

U. S. S. HONOLULU,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 27, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I received your letter of 13 January. You may be sure that I will keep you fully, frankly and probably even critically informed of the situation out here.

During even the brief time that I have had to survey the situation, I am particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending this base. This matter has been fully covered in recent official correspondence. I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. I will expand on this later. It is sufficient at this time to state that a secure base here is of paramount importance. I have discussed this matter fully with McCrea and he has taken notes on my ideas, and I am sure that he will present them fully.

We have been together long enough so that I am sure you are quite familiar with my methods of doing business. You know how I appreciate the value of conferences. I agree that it is essential to keep the principal subordinates within the command, fully informed of the circumstances as they develop. I shall follow such a policy.

As you know, the Fleet Personnel Board, with Theobald at the head of it, has been giving long and careful study to the personnel requirements of the ships of the different types. I shall probably be required to make recommendations on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction.

[2] I now come to a point which I have discussed fully with Joe and with which we are in complete accord. Richardson believes and recommends that under present conditions I should move ashore with my staff. I believe, from my conception of what a campaign in the Pacific under present policies will amount to, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and his staff should be quartered ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, at least in the initial stages of the campaign. Facilities on the Fleet flagship are not sufficient to provide living and working accommodations for the personnel required on the staff. It is neither desirable nor practicable to scatter the staff through other ships of the Fleet. As I see it, the only solution lies in having them assembled ashore in the district. I have looked into this matter to a certain extent and believe that existing facilities within the district, particularly at the Submarine Base, are such that the staff can be quartered there. It appears that certain modifications and additions to the present communication set-up will have to be provided, in order that a complete communication set-up will be available. Facilities for office space, quarters for officers and enlisted men of the staff can be made available with little rearrangement of what now exists in the Submarine Base. Of course, that would be of a temporary nature. As soon as I have investigated this whole thing more fully and have had an opportunity to visualize the picture more completely, I believe that the correct solution to the whole problem will lie in the erection of a separate building to house the complete requirements of the Commander-in-Chief's staff ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District. I am not prepared to give you the details of this at this writing. Incidentally, in connection with the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, I believe that he himself should be assigned to one of the official quarters now in the Fourteenth Naval District.

You appreciate, of course, that this question of housing the staff ashore, has not passed much beyond the preliminary investigations. As you know, however, I have already obtained quarters for the War Plans Section in the Submarine Base and that section of four officers and all the files necessary for their work will be moved into those quarters very soon after 1 February. If further study of the Pacific set-up, as I visualize it, [3] substantiates my present ideas, and if the quarters I have in mind in the Submarine Base show that they can take my staff, I shall move from the PENNSYLVANIA to those quarters as soon as they can be made ready. In that connection, of course, you understand that the present facilities on board the PENNSYLVANIA will remain intact and that I shall arrange matters ashore so that my entire staff and myself can move on board the PENNSYLVANIA within a few hours. I shall, of course, be on board the PENNSYLVANIA whenever tactical exercises are conducted and during any other times when I feel the necessity for it. My staff battle organization will require training on the PENNSYLVANIA, and I shall embark on that ship for enough fleet work to keep them trained for any emergency.

If I move ashore and find that the arrangement as I now visualize it is the correct one, I shall have plans drawn up for a permanent Fleet Center ashore. I shall submit the plans to the Bureau and request funds for its immediate construction.

Things are buzzing around here, and I am taking every opportunity and a lot of Joe's time, to get his points of view on many vital questions that are involved in this job. I was sorry to hear that you had an attack of the flu, but happy to know, from the press reports of the arrival of the KING GEORGE V, that you were able to get to sea in the Chesapeake to greet the new Ambassador.

That seems to be about all for this time; but I am sure that I shall have a lot more to tell you in our continued correspondence.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you and your good wife, as always.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[1] CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET

Secret

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 18 February 1941.

DEAR BETTY: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interference with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for \$39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for \$9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the Nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor. [2] I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARES to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palmyra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palmyra. I think our recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate correspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regulaion proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwarded me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.

I come to another question of the highest importance,—the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact in all the aeronautical organization afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrains" vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Draemel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy.

Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese *trade routes*. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

HEK.

[1] CinC File No.

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*U. S. Submarine Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 22, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: So far I have not felt the need for a Public Relations Officer on my Staff. Situated as we are, the majority of this work has been very successfully handled by the District under Admiral Bloch. We have been in perfect accord as to what should and should not be released. From the standpoint of the newspaper and publicity men the situation may not be as satisfactory as it is from my standpoint. I can see where the services of a man like Waldo Drake could be of great value to the Service. So my answer is that if you can

send Waldo Drake out here to serve on my staff, I will be very glad to have him. An individual with less experience might do more harm than good.

We have been very much gratified at the responses to the items I enumerated in my letter of February 18. However, there is one outstanding deficiency that still exists in the Fleet—namely, permanency of personnel. The detachment of officers and men continues. I have written at length to Nimitz on this subject. I understand in some degree the personnel problem that confronts you and Nimitz. I feel that the establishment of a nucleus of trained and experienced officers and men in each ship of the Fleet is vital. This nucleus should include the Captain, Executive Officer, Heads of Departments and as many other key officers as the Bureau feels they can retain in the ship for the duration of the emergency. For the enlisted personnel the same principle should govern, particularly as regards Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. We cannot produce a satisfactory state of battle efficiency unless we have some degree of permanency in this nucleus of personnel. We must have on board a certain number of officers and men who know the ship, know the organization and who can whip the new personnel into shape by guiding their efforts. I know that you and Nimitz are doing all that you can but I cannot refrain from calling your attention to it once more.

Is it not possible to obtain legislation which will stop the discharge of qualified men and permit them to remain in their present billets?

I have now been established in my office on shore for some little time and things are working very smoothly. I am of course prepared to move aboard ship on very short notice.

[2] I know you are cognizant of the condition in the Carriers, as I have detailed it in various official correspondence. The effect of detachment of a carrier or any light forces from this command will affect the operations out of all proportion to the apparent fighting strength of the forces detached. This I know you will understand and in anything that you do I know you will carefully weight all the factors involved.

Admiral Danckwarts spent a couple of days with us and gave me considerable information which is of value. I did not, however, commit myself in any way and tried to avoid talking too much.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you.

We are all cheerful.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. I must urge you once more to do all in your power to fill the ships with enlisted personnel to the limit of their capacity. Our ideas on this subject have been submitted in great detail. The last submitted about two weeks ago was the report of our medical board on this subject.

/s/ KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[1] Confidential
Via Clipper Air Mail

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., May 5, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I have your despatch in regard to the proposed visit of the Secretary. I am forwarding an official letter on this subject in this same mail. I think we will be able to give him an interesting time out here. I indicated the time that he might spend at sea if he so desires. I imagine, however, when we make up the final schedule he will probably want to spend more time in port than I have indicated in my official letter. There are a great many developments in and around the Pearl Harbor area that he should see and in which I am sure he will be very much interested. A perfectly enormous amount of work has been accomplished in this district and it is all going ahead full blast at the present time.

We had planned rather extensive tactical maneuvers for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE which involved a trip to Midway by Task Force ONE and to

Palmyra by Task Force TWO. When I received your letter in regard to certain ship movements we decided to curtail these operations and to maintain Task Forces ONE and TWO in the immediate vicinity of Oahu. I do not want to be caught short in the event of any sudden demands.

Tell the Secretary that I will be very pleased indeed to see him. I am endeavoring to keep you informed primarily by official correspondence of the needs of the Fleet. I believe you are fully cognizant of all the problems. As you know, our principal problem out here is one of supply, particularly to outlying bases. Our food ships, store ships, oilers and ammunition ships are barely adequate now and this would be the cause of concern in the event of hostilities. I know you are doing all you can along this line. The transports are coming along very slowly. Brown goes to the Coast with a minimum force, starting in a few days to look over the progress of the landing force needs and to conduct the scheduled exercise at San Clemente. It looks now as though King's estimate that an AK will be required to accompany each division of transports to transport equipment, particularly landing boats, is absolutely correct. I feel that in any landing exercises that we may undertake, it should be done only when we have ample equipment and personnel to pursue our objectives to a successful conclusion, even in the event of the loss of very important units. In other words the landing should not be attempted until we have what amounts to an overwhelming force capable of a simultaneous landing.

[2] We are losing quite a percentage of experienced enlisted men who, upon the expiration of their enlistment, go into civil life to accept the high wages now prevailing. This is a cause of concern and I repeat again something should be done to retain these men. The only method I can see is by congressional legislation of some kind. We are attempting to use every bit of Fleet transportation from the West Coast to Honolulu to bring personnel and supplies out here. I believe you might help things if you would indicate to the material bureaus the shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our demands as to cargo such as bombs and ammunition. The type of incident I have in mind is the shipment of the supply of bombs from N. A. S., San Diego, which we finally straightened out with the Bureau of Ordnance after the exchange of several despatches.

I hope Nimitz is taking our idea of nucleus crews seriously. This applies to officers as well as men. We must have sufficient experienced men in key positions in the ship who know the ship in order to properly train the young reserve officers and the recruits. Of course, this is over and above the urgent necessity to keep these ships in a condition to meet an emergency. Briefly I think if some twenty percent of the complement could be considered permanently assigned to the ships that it would help things enormously. I shall send forward our ideas on this subject in a more definite form shortly.

I know the demands upon you for patrol craft of all descriptions but I must again bring to your attention the urgent need in this area for some patrol craft fitted with listening gear and carrying a few depth charges. The demands upon destroyers would then be somewhat relieved and they could have time to perfect themselves in other phases of their training.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Air Mail

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

[1] Cincpac File No.

Confidential

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., May 16, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: The ammunition situation continues unsatisfactory and is a source of concern to me in regard to gunnery school and target practice ammunition as it affects training, and mobilization and reserve service ammunition as it affects the general readiness of the Fleet. The problem as we see it here is

chiefly one of transportation, since in general the ammunition is available but not where we can get at it.

Late in the winter I asked that gunnery school ammunition be delivered to the Hawaiian Area not later than 2 June, 1941 and that certain target practice ammunition be delivered here for use early in the gunnery year. Action on this request was an order to assemble gunnery school ammunition at N. A. D. Mare Island by 15 May 1941, with the request that it be delivered to Pearl Harbor by vessels of the Fleet since no other transportation was available, and an order for shipment of a large part of the required target practice ammunition by PYRO and LASSEN from the East Coast by loading various vessels of the Base Force with gunnery school ammunition as it is assembled at Mare Island during this month, we are in a fair way of getting enough of it here by 2 June to commence gunnery school firings.

In view of the fact that PYRO and LASSEN were not scheduled to arrive before the end of July I requested by despatch that target practice ammunition be shipped by rail across country so that it too could be transported here by vessels of the Fleet, stating that we could use this ammunition as soon as delivered. This request was not approved for reasons best known to the Department. Since the LASSEN is now scheduled to arrive here about 21 July, with a part of this ammunition, and the PYRO about 11 August, with the remainder, there will be a period of approximately two months during which the Fleet will be deprived of gunnery training except for gunnery school firings.

Since PYRO and LASSEN are already loading on the East Coast no further action to expedite shipment of target practice ammunition appears feasible, and we shall have to accept the handicap in training imposed by the lack of this ammunition. This is already water over the dam and I mention it only because I feel the time has come when the long haul of ammunition between the East and West Coasts by ammunition ships should cease and full use be made of rail transportation to place needed ammunition at West Coast ports where we can get at it. Obviously in the event of hostilities water transportation of ammunition from the East to the West Coast will be too slow and risky.

The shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, has placed us in a very serious position. Upon the urging of the Department I recommended a cut to the minimum possible allowance per gun for annual training and proposed to transfer all type gunnery school machine gun allowances to the Fleet Machine Gun School. Type gunnery [2] school allowances of machine gun ammunition have since been eliminated entirely, and we now find ourselves in the position where the Fleet Machine Gun School has only enough ammunition to last until 10 June. On that date we shall be forced to close down the Fleet Machine Gun School unless more ammunition is made available.

I stress the urgent need for early delivery of target ammunition in ample quantities because the turnover of personnel continues high and I can see no improvement in the near future. The only way we can counteract this and give adequate training to large masses of green personnel is to provide ammunition for frequent firings.

I have stressed gunnery school and target practice ammunition because up to the opening of hostilities they may be considered our first requirement, and we can only hope that the last increments of mobilization supply, which are on their way, arrive in time. So far as mobilization supply is concerned the battleships and heavy cruisers are well fixed. The light cruisers and destroyers are still short, particularly in 6", 5" anti-aircraft and depth charges, although ammunition orders indicate that by midsummer deficiencies will be made up. In this connection it is suggested, when forces are moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic, that the Bureau of Ordnance be informed as early as it is practicable to do so, in order that final increments of mobilization ammunition, and target practice ammunition for that matter, loaded in ships for delivery to Pearl Harbor may be diverted at West Coast ports and not brought out here.

The situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory. Here again I realize it is largely a matter of transportation and that reserve service ammunition must come after mobilization ammunition. When PYRO becomes available as a ship of the Base Force she can be used in shuttle trips to the coast to bring up our reserve supply. We are making every effort to transport ammunition of all kinds in vessels of the Fleet, and I am happy to note that the Naval Air Station San Diego was permitted to give up some aircraft bombs for transportation out here in ENTERPRISE. Also an order to ship 1,000 depth charge from Howthorne was a great help. These will be transported in ships of the Fleet.

Once we are over the midsummer hump we shall be in a much better position, *provided* the inevitable does not happen first. Even then, however, the supply of reserves will be critical and the use of rail transportation urgent.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to Rear Admiral Blandy.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No. A16/0828

Secret

26 MAY 1941.

From: CinC

To: OpNav

Subj: Survey of Conditions in Pac. Ft.

I. PERSONNEL.

(a) *Stability.* A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel.* Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and [2] heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.* The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau [3] of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor. The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the

figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate [4] fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.* The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

[5] (e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.* It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

(f) *Uniform.* There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. AVIATION.

(a) *Aviation Training.* The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

[6] (3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.* The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early [7] prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.

[8] (c) *Separate Air Force.* This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the [9] availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. MATERIAL, GENERAL.

(a) *Priorities.* The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is [10] limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of

priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range anti-aircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The [11] imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR Equipment*. Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of opNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. OPERATIONS.

(a) *Fleet Operations*. With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, [12] and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive [13] operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tanks to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having

difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

(b) *Fourteenth Naval District.* The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

[14] The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine.* The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and [15] large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support.* Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. NATIONAL POLICY.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in [16] principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use [17] and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. INFORMATION.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies [18] and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. [19] A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 4 June 1941.

Confidential
Memorandum for Admiral Stark

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located in the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands.

[S] H. E. KIMMEL.

[1]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 26, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been thinking:

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard to Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for providing [2] for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—

(a) *Transports and Light Destroyer Transports.*—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

(b) *Marine Equipment:* The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

[3] We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) *Ammunition Facilities:* The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barracaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize [4] that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

(1) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

(3) *Communications.* The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

[5] In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

(4) *Aviation Requirements.* These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:—

(a) *Pre-Fleet Training.* Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

(b) *New Torpedo Planes.* Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

(c) *Conversions for Carrier Landing Training.* Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots *must* be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

(d) *A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment.* This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

(e) *I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment.* This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

[6] (f) *Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's).* Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

(g) *Landplane Field at Johnston Island.* This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

(h) *Kechi Lagoon Development.* This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this

area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

(i) *Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point.* This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Cincpac File No.
Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 30, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of 25 July as to the possibility of using a carrier for transporting a load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports, I want to give some of my own views as to such an undertaking.

Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my province, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. It is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur.

My views against diversion of carriers from their proper duties to act as aircraft transports are well known. If planes must be sent from the United States to Russia, the question of flying them out via Alaskan and Eastern Siberia fields should be most fully inquired into. That appears to be the most logical method of effecting delivery.

Should it be finally determined to use one of our carriers as a transport, the time chosen should be one in which all three Pacific Fleet carriers are available for operation. This is essential in order to minimize the danger to the carrier transport.

The port of destination should certainly not be to the westward of the Japan-Kurile-Kamchatka line.

I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered, (as is highly probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese-American War. If we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of more effective ways for gaining initial advantage.

A carrier sent on such an operation manifestly must be protected. After careful consideration, I am constrained to feel that the minimum escort and covering force provided should be the entire Pacific Fleet. I also feel that combatant air or naval forces of a potential enemy encountered should be engaged at once rather than wait for them to gain an initial advantage through destroying any part of my own fighting strength.

In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensive action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous to ourselves. Certainly an operation such as that proposed is far less likely to bluff Japan into acquiescence or inactivity than it is to disturb her to the point of hostile use of bombs, torpedoes and guns.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[1] Cincpac File No.
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., August 12, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: Your news about the approval of 533,000 men and 105,000 Marines for the Navy is good news. I agree with everything you said in your letter on the subject and I certainly give you and Nimitz full credit for getting them under the conditions which exist. We should lose no time in getting our ships filled up. I am ready to accept draftees if we cannot get them by voluntary enlistments quickly.

I forwarded to Furlong all the information you gave me about Tommy Hart's trouble with mines. We are waiting for Blandy's report, which I have not yet seen. I should like to have it at an early date.

Thanks very much for the copy of Coronet which you sent to me. I turned to page 86 and was somewhat shocked at the appearance of the photograph on that page. However, I sent it on to Dot and know that she will be pleased as I was to receive it. Please give my regards to Mrs. Hull.

I note Ghormley's views on the importance of RDF, or RADAR as we call it. I think I can assure you that the officers of the Fleet are fully alive to the importance of this development. We have stressed its use in every exercise and are constantly drilling and training with it. We have had men transferred to the ships so equipped to the limit of the capacity of ships having them. Army personnel have been trained aboard ships. I think you understand from our letters as well as from my verbal remarks to you on this subject how important we feel this development to be. I believe the numbers of the equipment in the Fleet is far behind what it should be. I shall permit nothing to interfere with its installation in the ships as we receive the gear. It should be given the highest priority in manufacture, supply and installation. We have not yet received any purely gunnery RADAR. In this connection, stress should be laid upon what the British call "IFF" (Identification, Friend or Foe) for installation in ships and planes; to the ASV (or RADAR in a plane to spot surface vessels); to the AI (RADAR in a plane to spot other planes). I don't know when we can expect these various types of RADAR but I do know that we need no urging in the Fleet to do anything within our power to get and use all the various types of RADAR that have been developed.

Many thanks for the news about the detail of the twelve PT's to the Fourteenth Naval District. This is a good start but neither Bloch nor I will rest easy until we get the various patrol vessels we have requested in official correspondence. I do hope you will impress on the Secretary the vital importance of this [2] matter. We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean.

You have approved our plan for putting guns and marines on Wake. The first detachment of 165 Marines, one battery of 5" and one battery of 3" are now on their way. We will send the additional guns when transportation becomes available. A recent survey of the men required to man the defenses of Wake plus the other outlying islands indicates the desirability of forming another defense battalion for service in this area. I feel that there is no doubt that an additional defense battalion to provide periodic reliefs and replacements will be necessary. We will give you an official letter on this subject shortly.

We have received the Department's plan in regard to the Marine Division and transports and your ideas as to the composition of the 5,000 men to be stationed in Oahu. We agree in general with all the plans but we would like the men, equipment and transports now. I know that you also would like them and will get them just as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so. I find that some of the defense battalions already out here are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. I do think that the few machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other activities and I hope that the ammunition situation will be remedied very shortly.

The recreation facilities at Pearl Harbor are coming rapidly to a state where they can and are being used by the men of the Fleet. Baseball, softball and football fields, though by no means entirely adequate have been commissioned and

we have large numbers of men who occupy these fields daily. The swimming pool at Aiea is filled to capacity at all times. We can use at least two more pools of this same size. The Fleet Recreation Center was partially commissioned on the first of August and will be in full operating condition within another week. It has been crowded with men from the day it was opened. The facilities include a very large soft drink and sandwich stand, an enormous bar where beer is served, and a large number of chairs and tables in a very pleasant surrounding. It includes ten bowling alleys, eleven pool tables, a reading and writing room, all of which have been in commission from the first of August. The stadium will be in commission within the week. It is suitable for boxing and wrestling tournaments or ship's entertainments and for the movies. It will seat approximately 6,000 men and movies can be shown to approximately 4,000 men at one time. About a thousand families are now living in the houses built for that purpose. All of the [3] remainder will be in commission by the first of January. These houses are being finished daily and are occupied as soon as completed. Bloch is going a great job.

The visits to the West Coast have been very successful and have, I believe, helped all hands. They are worth while and I believe should be continued as long as the international situation permits. I have watched the international situation in relation to the cruises to the West Coast and shall not hesitate to cancel them if, in my opinion, the situation so warrants. You will probably have information sooner than I do which will warrant the cancellation of such cruises and I shall of course expect advice or orders from you on this subject.

The Honolulu people have been very fine in their continued efforts to entertain the officers and men of the Fleet in their homes and on their plantations. The entertainment of enlisted men by the Honolulu people has been on a scale which taxes their capacity and is still going on. They deserve great credit for everything that they have done, except the increase in rentals.

We recently submitted a letter dealing with the permanency of detail of Captains and Executive Officers of battleships. This letter was prepared by Admiral Pye at my instigation. I forwarded it with my hearty approval. The letter strongly recommends that no officer be assigned as Captain or Executive Officer of a battleship unless it is reasonably certain that he will remain in that billet for not less than two years. Specifically, it recommends that no officer coming up for selection within the period of his detail be assigned to either of these two billets. I consider this a matter of first importance. If you read the letter to the Bureau of Navigation you will see that no Captain or Executive Officer now in these ships has been there for as long as a year. The exact times are set forth. We cannot expect satisfactory progress unless we make the tours of duty of our officers sufficiently long for them to give something to the job. I know this is an old story but it is an old story which is much to the discredit of our service. The recommendations from battleships apply with equal force to heavy and light cruisers. In these ships the Captains in general comply with the specifications set forth because they are taken from the more junior ones. In the case of Executives I fear the situation is about the same as it is in battleships. Brown is now making a survey of the Captains and Executives in cruisers and I expect to forward that shortly to the Bureau of Navigation.

In another recent letter to the Bureau of Navigation we made specific recommendations in regard to the Commanding Officers of destroyer divisions and squadrons. I am happy to say that Nimitz has informed me that he will carry out our recommendations in regard [4] to the destroyer division and squadron commanders. I wish to add that I have not yet had time to hear from the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the battleship Captains and Executives.

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be prepared for battle than for a target practice. Recent reports that have come to me on the firing of SRP "B" are very encouraging. The reports are fragmentary and I hear most about the ships that have made high scores. For example, the LOUISVILLE has three "E" turrets, six "E" five-inch guns and one "E" three-inch gun. I know this because I went aboard the LOUISVILLE a couple of days ago. Other ships are doing very well indeed.

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target practices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these

directives now and I hear from all sides that it is considered much more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.

To summarize, I feel that the morale of the officers and men of the Fleet is very satisfactory, that everyone is working to the limit of his capacity, that we are never going to be satisfied; but that we all feel that we are making progress and beginning to get some dividends from our efforts.

What we need more than anything else right now is men. I have recently written Nimitz that this Fleet can use 20,000 additional men today. I will not go into that further at this time because I know that both you and Nimitz know this just as well as I do.

Keep cheerful. We are ready to do our damndest.

Yours as always,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA (Flagship)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 22 August 1941.

Personal

Secret

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY: I mailed today an official letter on the condition of the material readiness of the fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. I wish to call your attention particularly to the unsatisfactory conditions disclosed in this letter.

We now have on hand and operating from carriers 41 F4F-3 and F4F-3A fighting planes (of which 6 are currently under overhaul or major repair) and 17 obsolescent fighting planes. This makes a total of 52 fighting planes available for 3 aircraft carriers and 2 Marine fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. Our operating allowance, not counting spares, is 90.

I think you should take some drastic action to remedy this deplorable condition.

My kindest regards as always.

Most sincerely yours,

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.

12 September 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the following note on above letter and returned to Admiral Kimmel.

DEAR MUSTAPHA:

See our serial 0136723 of 12 sept.

Best we can do.

Keep cheerful.

/S/ BETTY.

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., August 26, 1941.

CinC File No.
 P16-1/MM/(96)
 Serial 01342
Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Expansion Program—Personnel for.

References:

(a) CinCpac Conf. disp. 182351 of August 1941.

(b) BuNav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406 and 1450 of August 11, 1941.

(c) BuNav Conf. disp. 201824 of August 1941.

1. Transfer orders dated August 11, 1941 from the Bureau of Navigation to Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, as enumerated in references (b),

require a total of 222 rated men from the Pacific Fleet for transfer to U. S. S. HORNET squadrons, two new Atlantic patrol squadrons and the Naval Air Stations, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. The Pacific Fleet has only a bare minimum of such ratings to meet present operating requirements. Similar ratings are needed for advanced training groups now in the process of being formed in the Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief has had no previous warning of this heavy demand upon the Pacific Fleet. As indicated in reference (c), transfer of these ratings is being held in abeyance pending departmental reconsideration.

2. Of these 222 rated men a total of 88 radiomen qualified in aircraft is required and a total of 61 aviator machinist's mates in the experienced class namely chiefs, first and second class is required. In order that a bare minimum of one qualair radioman be assigned each operating plane requiring such a rate for the performance of its mission, a total of 437 such ratings is required in the Pacific Fleet. According to the latest available figures there are a total of 324 such ratings in the Pacific Fleet and the transfer of 88 in accordance with reference (b) will leave a total of 236 or 54% of the minimum needed for safety and ability to carry out the mission of all operating planes requiring such ratings. Figures in regard to aviation machinist's mates indicate a total of 988 chief, first and second class allowed, whereas there are only 722 now holding these rates in the Pacific Fleet or 73%. Removal of 61 such ratings as required in reference (b) will reduce the percentage to 67%. These percentages will be further reduced by the transfer of such ratings to the advanced training groups now forming in the Pacific. These ratings of qualair radioman and chief, first and second class aviation machinist's mates must be considered key personnel in the aeronautical organization. Safety of operations and ability to carry out the mission depend on such ratings. The reduction of the percentage of these key men will adversely affect readiness for war of Pacific Fleet aviation.

[2] 3. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Bureau of Navigation the increasingly serious situation which is resulting from rapid expansion of all phases of Naval activities without sufficient increases in available men in the Fleet to train for purposes of meeting the personnel requirements of this expansion. The current practice of constantly withdrawing trained men from the Fleet cannot continue if the Fleet is to remain in a satisfactory state of readiness. The huge building program, both aircraft and surface vessels, will require more trained personnel for manning than can possibly be obtained under the current program of draining already under-complemented Fleet units. At least two years are required to train acceptable petty officers. The consequences of continuing along the present apparently unplanned path will be dire. The critical shortage with which the combatant air units of the Fleet will be faced if the subject transfers are made is merely the beginning of a deplorable situation which will certainly develop unless there is adequate planning for training personnel to meet the demands of expansion. The Pacific Fleet can and will train the required ratings if given the material. Class "A" schools must be immediately enlarged to cover the entire program. Induction of recruits must be enormously increased.

4. The Commander-in-Chief is convinced that the building program and the training program are not synchronized. Unless intra-departmental coordination and review of the entire question of supplying personnel for the expanding Navy are effectively undertaken, the current condition cannot be sensibly improved.

5. It is therefore most urgently recommended:

(a) That, in meeting the *immediate* demands of expansion, the distribution of available personnel in the Navy be reviewed and a program be established for the acquisition of required ratings from the forces both afloat and ashore in such a manner as to avoid the depletion of any ratings below an acceptable minimum in any combatant organization; this review to form the basis for the reconsideration, requested in reference (a), of current orders for transfer of aviation ratings.

(b) That the entire expansion program be reviewed in order to determine in detail the rate at which personnel will be required properly to man the new units.

[3] (c) That, through the immediate and adequate expansion of Class "A" service schools and the supply of additional recruits to the Fleets and shore stations, the training of men be undertaken now in sufficient numbers to meet the maximum demands as they occur.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

BUNav

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[1] Cine File No.
Personal
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., August 26, 1941.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy, .
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY. I have your letter of 21 August dealing with the question of aviation personnel required to man new patrol plane squadrons and the squadrons for the HORNET plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. I have some appreciation of the problem which confronts you and I wish to state that I yield to no one in my desire to be of the maximum assistance to the Navy as a whole, but my immediate responsibility is the Pacific Fleet. You must bear with me if I present the viewpoint and opinion as viewed from where I sit. I know that you have never wanted anything else and you can rest assured that you will never get anything else from me.

In the first place, the orders for the transfers directed in the various Bunav serials left no time for consideration and to make the best distribution of transfers. The situation changes so rapidly in personnel and almost invariably for the force that I can see no answer except to make my protest and gather the facts based on the very latest figures. As we set forth in the official letter which is now on its way to you, we now have in the ratings of aviation machinist's mates: chiefs, first class and second class, just 73% of complement. When transfers directed by the serials in question are completed we will have 67% of complement in these ratings. The excess is entirely in third class ratings. We can spare these ratings with least resultant harm to the organizations. We have been trying to build up these ratings against the time when we could look forward to double crews. You know full well that the chiefs, first class and second class, are the men that bear the brunt of maintaining the planes and insuring their safe and efficient operation. I think when you lump the third class ratings into a picture to indicate an over-complement the picture is not accurate. We make no protest on the transfer of third class ratings and will be glad to comply under the existing circumstances.

[2] On the basis of one (qualair) radioman for each plane, we now have 74% of the number required. After transfers are completed we will have 54%. I note in the directive for transfers to the HORNET that 16 (qualair) radiomen are required for the Utility Unit.

Transfers required take long-time men, leaving us with all the short-timers which is an added handicap. We are now attempting to organize our pre-Fleet training units at San Diego who require most of all the ratings I have just mentioned.

Our percentages deduced from the Base Force reports of 30 June vary by some 11 to 16% from the figures given in your letter and they are uniformly lower than your figures.

If after you have read this letter you still feel that we should make the transfers required by Bunav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406, and 1450, we can complete the transfers from the Pacific Fleet by 30 September, with the bulk completed considerably earlier than that and at the same time insure the ratings are taken from activities which will result in the least harm in the various organizations.

If you can assure me that we wont be fighting the Japs within the next six months I will gladly make the transfers without the least protest. We can, will, and have been, training men in this Fleet just as rapidly as the existing facilities, including the number of recruits supplied, permit. I will not say anything further about the need for additional men because you have my views in a great many communications on the subject and I know you are doing everything within your power to improve the situation.

I will take steps to insure the preliminary planning necessary to an expeditious execution of the orders contained in the various serials and will give the order to go ahead just as soon as you indicate by dispatch or otherwise what your judgment dictates.

With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

[1] CinC File No.
Secret

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 12, 1941.

Dear "BETTY": We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for *surface* raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much concern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We cannot carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "status quo" and, if necessary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON. I feel that their movement to the Pacific, now, would have a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that *all* our thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be prepared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased demands for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distance involved and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job properly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity if *we have the strength to meet it*. Do not misunder-

stand me—I don't discount the Atlantic problem—but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.

Sincerely,

/s/ KIMMEL.

[1]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *October 22, 1941.*

#1

Secret

DEAR BETTY: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the *CASTOR* and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

The *CURTISS* arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the *WEST VIRGINIA* until about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of many things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want now to repeat some of them once more. The urgency for additional patrol craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not [2] worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continuously. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhaul at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational

forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the *NORTH CAROLINA* and *WASHINGTON*, would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the Jong range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We [3] have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the *HONOLULU* Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the *HONOLULU* Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume these are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

[4] I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to

Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

[S] H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET—FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 29, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I had Mr. Hallet Abend for lunch with me today. He has just completed a tour for the Reader's Digest and his travels took him to Singapore, Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. He gave us some very interesting information. The most vital information was information which he had received from officials in Australia and New Zealand that if Japan attacks Russia the British Empire will declare war on Japan. He was also assured that the Dutch East Indies would follow Great Britain and that the Dutch are anxious that the war start. They feel that the present set-up in the world gives them a better chance now than they will ever have again, so long as Japan has her bases in Indo China.

At the present writing it appears that the most probable direction for Japanese adventures is to the Northward. If they do embark on such an adventure and Britain and the Dutch East Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do?

I have no means of knowing the accuracy of the statements. It may be that the idea was planted with Mr. Abend as a propaganda measure and he was told by the officials who informed him that he could publish it after he got to the United States. I am informing you in order that you may run it down, and also in the hope that you may give me some inkling of what we will do in such a contingency.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

[S] H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The officials told Mr. Abend that this information came from the Privy Council but he was not privileged to use this.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

Personal and Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., November 6, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: I have just signed a communication to you setting forth our estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. This estimate represents meticulous observations, principally by radio, over a long period of time with what we conceive to be reasonable deductions therefrom. I think there can be no doubt that the Japanese have expended very large sums and much effort in their attempt to strengthen the Mandates and provide numerous operating bases for submarines and aircraft. The numbers of aircraft are of necessity an estimate, but with adequate operating bases for both submarines and aircraft, additional forces can be very quickly moved into the Mandates, depending upon the situation.

You will note, of course, that our estimate differs considerably from the one prepared in the Navy Department. I doubt very much if the Navy Department's effort has had the care expended upon it that we have given to the one we submitted.

I must call your attention again to the anti-submarine effort that will be required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with reasonable security. You have approved installation of sound gear in the DM's, in the AM's, the AVP's, certain AT's, and the AVD's. At the present writing, the following vessels of these classes are lacking in sound gear and we have been furnished no date from the Department on which we can expect deliveries of same.

DM's: PRUITT, TRACY, PREBLE, SICARD, DORSEY, LAMBERTON, BOGGS and ELLIOT.

AVP's: TEAL, PELICAN, SWAN and AVOCET.

AM's: BOBOLINK, GREBE, KINGFISHER, RAIL, ROBIN, SEAGULL, TERN, TURKEY, VIREO.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

AT's: NAVAJO and SEMINOLE.

AVD's: HULBERT, BALLARD, THORNTON, WILLIAMSON, GILLIS and McFARLAND.

[2] In other words, we have in this area 29 ships which can be fitted with sound gear and which are not so fitted. This is a very large number of potentially useful submarine hunters.

I note that you plan to send 24 VSO's to the Asiatic Fleet in January. I presume that you now plan to send those VSO's crated, in cargo vessels. Unless the situation changes materially I strongly recommend against sending them in a carrier.

I have frequently mentioned the very great desirability of having a flight deck merchant ship for use in training aviators for carrier duty. On reflection, I have changed my mind to the extent that instead of providing one carrier of this type for each coast, we should provide about ten such carriers for each coast. Such ships operating in conjunction with cruisers or even destroyers, have a very great potential value. Of course, the mercantile aircraft carriers I am now recommending should be fully equipped for combat purposes—something that I did not contemplate when we recommended the carrier for flight deck training only.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. I have forwarded today by air mail the comments of Com-14, the Commanding General, and myself on the subject of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Oahu. You will note that we have presented several objections and feel that in any event the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force have no place in such an operating center. I feel that the quarters and buildings we have requested for these agencies should be proceeded with forthwith; no matter what decision is finally made in regard to an operating center the buildings we have requested will be necessary.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 15 November, 1941.

DEAR "BETTY": In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under any circumstances; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we now have limits their effectiveness.

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have sufficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese home waters. We should have the strength to make any enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

[2] If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment.

With best wishes,

H. E. KIMMEL

[1]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Ser. #8

S-e-c-r-e-t

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 2, 1941.

DEAR BETTY: We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as

long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should ease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"-51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, [3] provisions to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that: (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both surface and anti-aircraft; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized, for training purposes. (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrison's now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they sent when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshalls and Carolines in an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

[5] My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[6] P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they authorized him to charter ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure

the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the development of the island bases to the Army I do know that it has complicated our problems considerably.

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General Short has taken hold of this problem which dropped in his lap.

H. E. KIMMEL

[7] P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL

[1] Ser. #9
Secret

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 12, 1941.

Dear Betty: Thanks for your letter. The Secretary is here and I have given him verbally as complete an account of the action last Sunday as I could. Pye, Bloch and General Short were present during the interview. Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the time that it occurred. There were 10 VP's in the air that morning but they of course could not adequately cover 360° of arc and their primary effort was directed against the submarine menace which everyone fully recognized. In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the Northward and Westward but none were made on the morning in question. You, of course, are familiar with the exchanges of VP squadrons and the teething trouble that such new squadrons always experience.

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea and I am happy to state that no casualties were incurred by any of them. The submarines were promptly and I hope effectively, dealt with. We believe that since the action started we have accounted for several submarines. A task force commanded by Newton, including one carrier, was between here and Midway and about 400 miles from Midway, South of the line of islands. This task force included 1 carrier, 3 CA's and a squadron of destroyers. Brown, in the INDIANAPOLIS, with 4 DM's was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with 3

CA's and 9 DD's was about 200 miles west of Oahu. The MINNEAPOLIS, with 4 DM's, was in the operating area to the Southward of Oahu.

The approximate locations of these forces are shown on the chart and in the statement enclosed herewith. The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. The condition of readiness of their planes is being reported by General Short.

The ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack wave was practically unopposed. The fact that all ships were able to open fire so promptly during the breakfast hour indicates that the ships in harbor were alert and prepared.

No amount of explanation can alter the results which are included in a letter which I am sending along to you today, giving in such detail as is now possible, the damage sustained. Prompt and vigorous action was taken in an attempt to intercept and destroy the attacking force. The Fifth Column activities added great confusion and it was most difficult to evaluate the reports received.

[2] We gave Halsey, Brown and Newton our best information and estimates. Our first estimate, based on very meager information indicated a carrier might be to the Northward. Halsey had hardly steadied on a course in that direction when he intercepted a message as to strong enemy forces approaching Barber's Point and promptly diverted his ship and search to the Southward. A false report of a transport landing troops at Barber's Point was picked up by an enemy ship and rebroadcast.

For a time, indications seemed to point more definitely to a carrier, to the Southward than to the Northward and I advised the forces at sea that enemy carriers might be in both directions. Radar information was conflicting; but that indicating planes to the Southward was strongly supported by R. D. F. bearings (not bilateral) of two Japanese calls showing carriers in that direction. Probably they were made by enemy ships planted there for the purpose; although some possibility still exists that a carrier may have been there.

We will endeavor to give you a complete account of our efforts when time permits. Up to now we have been far too busy in handling matters of the moment and planning for the future to collate and analyze the vast amount of conflicting matter that came in at the time.

I am enclosing an estimate of the situation, which will show you our present ideas on what we hope to accomplish. Needless to say we have been up to our ears in getting re-oriented; so much so that we have scarcely had time to feel the terrific shock.

The Secretary is taking with him photographs of the type of submarine which entered the harbor. This submarine 74' x 5½', bolted together in 3 sections and capable of 24 knots submerged, can pass under or around most nets. The Pearl Harbor anti-submarine net was down at the time the raid started. The submarine carried photographed silhouettes of Oahu from every angle of approach; and, among other things in its locker, it had an American Ensign. I shall forward shortly, considerable detailed information of this vessel.

Charts and other things from crashed planes, as well as information gained from the submarine prove that this raid was planned for months. Details had been worked out with the greatest care. Each pilot, judging from material from unburned or partially burned planes, carried a book of silhouettes of our ships. The charts of Pearl Harbor in planes were as good as anything we have. [3] They showed the berths for all types of our ships. I entertain no doubt that the loss of the OGLALA was entirely due to the fact that she was in the PENNSYLVANIA'S normal berth.

The inspiring thing in all this business is the conduct of officers and men. During the action it was magnificent and their efforts since have been untiring and effective. As destroyers were clearing the harbor, they were boarded by men from sunken ships anxious to do their part. Numerous instances have been reported to me of mass volunteering from sunken ships to go to sea in ships that were left. Marines, hearing of attacks on Midway and Wake, have insisted on being sent there.

Morale of all officers and men is high. They have but one thought and that is to be able to get at the enemy.

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.